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DON’T RELY ON PLAIN MEANING, TRUST YOUR 
INTUITION: TRUSTEES ARE NOT “INDIVIDUALS” 
ELIGIBLE TO RECOVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
UNDER § 362(K) 
ABSTRACT 
To help debtors obtain a fresh start post-bankruptcy, § 362(a) of the Code 
provides for an automatic stay, which enjoins creditors from taking any 
collection action against a debtor immediately upon the debtor’s filing for 
bankruptcy. Originally, victims of a stay violation relied solely on the 
bankruptcy court’s contempt power to recover damages. In 1984, Congress 
added a new subsection to § 362, now codified as § 362(k), to specifically 
authorize bankruptcy courts to award damages to an “individual injured” by a 
violation of the stay. Most importantly, § 362(k) permits bankruptcy courts to 
award punitive damages, which typically are not an available remedy for civil 
contempt. 
The circuit courts are split on whether a trustee may be considered an 
“individual injured” under § 362(k). The Third and Fourth Circuits hold that 
non-natural persons like trustees cannot recover damages under § 362(k), 
whereas the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that they can. Because the 
Code’s commercial and remedial provisions affect society in pervasive ways, 
the importance of a consistent interpretation of the Code should not be 
underestimated. 
Since punitive damages are only available under § 362(k), whether a trustee 
is considered an “individual” for the purposes of this statute can significantly 
affect his total damage award. Similarly, the issue of whether a party is an 
“individual” arises when other parties, such as chapter 11 debtors or non-
violating creditors that are corporations or other business entities, seek to 
remedy a violation of the stay. 
Utilizing the Supreme Court’s established method of interpreting the Code, 
this Comment first argues that the term “individual” under § 362(k) should 
only include entities that are (1) natural persons and (2) injured by the violation 
of the stay. Because a trustee is not a natural person, but a representative of the 
bankruptcy estate, and is not personally injured by a violation of the stay, 
§ 362(k) should not protect the trustee. 
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Next, this Comment applies a law-and-economics perspective to argue that 
awarding punitive damages to a trustee runs contrary to the policy rationale 
behind punitive damages. Thus, to be in accordance with congressional intent, 
a trustee should not be considered an “individual” under § 362(k) and should 
instead have to rely on the contempt remedy to receive damages for a violation 
of the stay. 
INTRODUCTION 
The stay provision in § 362(a) of the Code1 is a fundamental protection 
designed to offer debtors the “breathing spell” they need from creditors to be 
able to obtain a “fresh start” after bankruptcy.2 The automatic stay, which takes 
effect upon a debtor’s filing for bankruptcy, penalizes creditors who take any 
action against the debtor’s property without the court’s approval.3 Despite the 
automatic stay’s protection, however, bankruptcy courts are filled with 
heartbreaking stories of debtors whose lives were upended by creditors who 
willfully violated the stay by seizing debtors’ homes and cars,4 shutting off 
debtors’ utilities,5 and even repossessing debtors’ personal belongings6 to 
collect outstanding debts. 
One such story is of Robert and Cindy Baker, chapter 7 debtors whose 
outstanding debt included a purchase-money loan for household furniture.7 
Even after receiving notice of the Bakers’ filing, the creditor attempted to 
repossess the furniture to satisfy a small, unpaid loan, thereby violating the 
automatic stay.8 This creditor also violated the automatic stay in another 
bankruptcy proceeding by trying to repossess other debtors’ furniture.9 The 
bankruptcy judge noted that the debtor in the other bankruptcy proceeding was 
 
 1 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). 
 2 H.R. REP NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97 (“The automatic 
stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a 
breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”). 
 3 See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012). 
 4 Smith v. Homes Today, Inc. (In re Smith), 296 B.R. 46, 52 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2003) (creditor 
repossessed a debtor’s mobile home while debtor was physically inside it, requiring her to jump from the 
moving home to the ground). 
 5 See, e.g., Aponte v. Aungst (In re Aponte), 82 B.R. 738, 745 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (landlord 
repeatedly turned off the heat and hot water to the apartment rented by the tenant-debtor, even though the 
landlord knew of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing). 
 6 In re Baker, 183 B.R. 30, 31 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 32. 
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in tears at the prospect of losing her furniture.10 While the judge found no 
actual loss and no basis for compensatory damages, he nevertheless instructed 
the creditor to pay punitive damages to deter future violations.11 
Awarding punitive damages to debtors like those in In re Baker is 
intuitively appropriate because debtors rely on the automatic stay to offer 
guidance in times of extreme financial difficulty, to ensure that their property 
will be protected, and to provide relief in case their property is not protected.12 
Yet, sophisticated creditors take advantage of a debtor’s vulnerability and lack 
of familiarity with the bankruptcy rules and proceedings, sometimes 
maliciously and repeatedly.13 The bankruptcy court’s position reflects this 
intuition. In awarding punitive damages, courts have taken into account the 
effect of any such repossession of property on a debtor and his family,14 the 
motive of the repossessing creditor, and the relation between the debtor and the 
creditor.15 
While punitive damages may be appropriate for individual debtors in some 
circumstances, the debtor is not always the one to pursue a case against a 
creditor for violating the automatic stay. As a representative of the bankruptcy 
estate, a chapter 7 trustee also has standing to seek a remedy for a violation of 
the automatic stay.16 However, cases brought by trustees contrast starkly with 
those brought by individual debtors because a trustee’s case lacks the human 
element that characterizes cases like In re Baker. Unlike the debtor, the trustee 
does not suffer from bankruptcy and is simply doing his job to liquidate the 
debtor’s property and distribute the proceeds to creditors as efficiently as 
possible.17 
Furthermore, a trustee likely would not represent the estate against a 
creditor in a case like In re Baker in which the violation of the stay involved 
personal property or property with nominal value. In In re Baker, the furniture 
 
 10 Id. at 32 n.4. 
 11 Id. at 33. 
 12 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.03[1] (“[The stay] provides immediate relief for debtors in financial 
difficulty and . . . protects individual debtors’ exemption rights, and their ability to avoid liens on exempt 
property and redeem exempt personal property, by preventing creditors from seizing or selling the property at 
issue.”). 
 13 See, e.g., In re Baker, 183 B.R. at 32; Aponte v. Aungst (In re Aponte), 82 B.R. 738, 743, 745–46 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 14 See, e.g., In re Aponte, 82 B.R. at 745. 
 15 Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Assocs., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 85, 99 (M.D. Pa. 1984)). 
 16 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2006).  
 17 See id. § 704(a) (outlining the duties of the trustee). 
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debt likely would have been either exempted from the estate or worth too little 
to justify the trustee’s time and expense in asserting the stay.18 Because a 
trustee is not permitted to liquidate exempt property—which often includes 
homes, cars, and household furniture19—and generally does not liquidate 
property that has little value to the estate,20 a trustee does not have an interest 
in claiming a violation of the stay regarding such property.21 
Automatic stay violations resulting in small monetary damages but large 
intangible or emotional harm to the debtor, such as the violation in In re 
Baker,22 are precisely the ones that most warrant an award of punitive 
damages.23 In such cases, punitive damages are necessary to adequately deter 
creditors from violating the stay and punish violating creditors for their 
unconscionable actions against vulnerable debtors.24 In most cases brought by 
trustees, however, punitive damages are not necessary to accomplish the goals 
of deterrence and punishment,25 which are consistently cited as the primary 
policy reasons for awarding punitive damages.26 Compensatory damages and 
attorneys’ fees are sufficient to reach these ends.27 
This Comment argues that Congress did not intend for chapter 7 trustees to 
have access to the same options for recovery that are available to individual 
debtors. Section 362(k)28 provides an “individual injured” by a violation of the 
stay with a specific statutory remedy.29 This section enables an “individual” to 
recover compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and even punitive damages.30  
 
 18 See In re Baker, 183 B.R. at 31 (claim for $2,200); 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]–[2]. 
 19 See, e.g., In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the trustee was not entitled to 
take possession of debtors’ home, which was partially exempt, until the trustee paid off the homestead 
exemption in cash).  
 20 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]–[2].  
 21 In re Preston Lumber Corp., 199 B.R. 415, 416 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (“This collateral is 
encumbered far in excess of its worth. Accordingly, the estate should have no interest in administering these 
assets and the trustee would be expected to abandon them.”). 
 22 See In re Baker, 183 B.R. at 32 n.4. 
 23 See, e.g., id. at 33. 
 24 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.b. 
 25 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 26 See Varela v. Ocasio (In re Ocasio), 272 B.R. 815, 823 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002) (“When all is said and 
done, a punitive damage award will stand unless it clearly appears that the amount of the award exceeds the 
outer boundary of the universe of sums reasonably necessary to punish and deter the defendant’s conduct.” 
(quoting Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir. 2001))). 
 27 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.a. 
 28 Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, the 
text now contained in § 362(k) was designated as § 362(h). 
 29 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006). 
 30 Id. 
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Prior to the enactment of § 362(k), the contempt remedy under § 105(a)31 
provided the only remedial option for those victimized by violations of the 
stay.32 However, punitive damages are not available under § 105(a).33 The fact 
that Congress specifically used the term “individual” in § 362(k), rather than a 
broader term that encompasses both natural and non-natural persons, suggests 
that Congress intended to preclude trustees and other non-natural persons from 
recovering punitive damages under § 362(k).34 
Currently, the circuit courts are split on whether trustees qualify as 
individuals for purposes of § 362(k)35—the Ninth Circuit holds that a trustee is 
not an individual, while the Third Circuit holds that a trustee is an individual.36 
While many circuits have not yet ruled on a trustee’s status, the Second, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that corporate debtors, as non-
natural persons, should not be considered individuals under § 362(k), while the 
Fourth Circuit has held the opposite.37 Meanwhile, the district courts and 
bankruptcy courts of the undecided circuits have issued conflicting holdings on 
these two issues.38 
 
 31 Id. § 105(a) (authorizing a bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title”); Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (concluding that § 105(a)’s plain meaning allows the bankruptcy court to hold a party in civil 
contempt). 
 32 Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 F.2d 
1098, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Prior to the enactment [of § 362(k)], . . . the standard that governed the imposition 
of sanctions was that which governed contempt proceedings: a party generally would not have sanctions 
imposed for its violation of an automatic stay as long as it had acted without maliciousness and had had a good 
faith argument and belief that its actions did not violate the stay.”). 
 33 See also Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 885 
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the power to punish” through punitive sanctions extends beyond the remedial 
goals of § 105(a)). 
 34 See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 35 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[3]. 
 36 Compare Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1995), with Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. & 
Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990).  
 37 See, e.g., In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., 108 F.3d at 884; Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, 
Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1552–53 (11th Cir. 1996); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 
613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 
183, 186–87 (2d Cir. 1990). But see Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 
1986) (holding that “individual” includes a corporation).  
 38 Compare United States v. Midway Indus. Contractors, Inc. (In re Midway Indus. Contractors, Inc.), 
178 B.R. 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (corporate debtor is not an individual), Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gallatin State 
Bank, 173 B.R. 146, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (corporate debtor is not an individual), Gecker v. Gierczyk (In re 
Glenn), 379 B.R. 760, 762–63 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (trustee is not an individual), In re Fashions USA Inc., 
301 B.R. 528, 529–30 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (corporate debtor is not an individual), and McRoberts v. 
S.I.V.I. (In re Bequette), 184 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1995) (corporate debtor is not an individual), with 
Martino v. First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 439 (N.D. Ill. 1995) 
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Considering the pervasive nature of bankruptcy law and the importance of 
the automatic stay provision in bankruptcy cases,39 it is crucial for the courts to 
consistently define who is able to recover under § 362(k).40 Bankruptcy experts 
assert that divergent interpretations increase costs, harm bankruptcy law by 
preventing the courts from developing a coherent bankruptcy policy and 
jurisprudence, and undermine the predictability and stability of the bankruptcy 
system.41 Furthermore, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in a dissenting Supreme 
Court opinion, highlighted the importance of resolving such issues by aptly 
pointing out that every dollar spent litigating an issue is a dollar removed from 
a bankruptcy estate that may already be inadequate to satisfy creditors’ 
claims.42 
This Comment argues that a trustee is not an “individual” under § 362(k) 
and should therefore be limited to the remedies available under § 105, which 
do not include punitive damages. Part I gives a brief background of the 
statutory development and legislative history leading up to the 1984 
amendment that introduced § 362(k) into the Code, the current Code and its 
important automatic stay provision, and an explanation of the current dispute 
over who should qualify as an “individual” under § 362(k). 
Part II argues that the plain meaning of “individual” does not include a 
trustee under principles of statutory interpretation established by the Supreme 
Court. Furthermore, Part II argues that, even if a trustee is an “individual,” a 
trustee cannot be “injured” for the purposes of § 362(k) and therefore cannot 
recover. 
 
(trustee is an individual), and In re A & C Electric Co., 188 B.R. 975, 980 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (corporate 
debtor is an individual), aff’d sub nom. Divane v. A & C Electric Co., 193 B.R. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 39 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97 (“The 
automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the 
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure 
actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the 
financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy. The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. 
Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor’s property. Those 
who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.”). 
 40 Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Remedies and Damages for Violations of the Automatic Stay Provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.A. § 362(h)), by Parties Other Than the Federal Government, 153 A.L.R. FED. 
463 (1999). 
 41 Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the Supreme 
Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 176–77 (2000).  
 42 See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 409 (1993) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“An entity in bankruptcy can ill afford to waste resources on litigation; every dollar spent on 
lawyers is a dollar creditors will never see.”). 
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Part III analyzes the availability of damages for trustees if they are 
precluded from recovering under § 362(k). Specifically, this Part uses a law-
and-economics approach to argue that punitive damages, which are allowed 
under § 362(k), are not an appropriate remedy for trustees. Rather, trustees 
have an adequate remedy under the contempt power found in § 105(a). 
Part IV engages in a brief discussion on the possible implications for other 
players in a stay violation case if trustees are unable to use § 362(k) to recover 
damages. 
Finally, this Comment concludes by urging courts to rule in accordance 
with the plain meaning of and the congressional intent for § 362(k) until the 
Supreme Court decides the issue or Congress passes further legislation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Evolution of § 362(k), the Damages Provision of the Automatic Stay 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 codified the automatic stay in § 362 
of the Code.43 Section 362, as originally enacted under the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act, did not provide any specific statutory guidance regarding the award of 
damages for violation of the stay.44 The courts instead used their contempt 
power under § 105 to address automatic stay violations.45 Recovery under 
§ 105 is discussed in more detail later in this Comment.46 
As a part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984, Congress introduced a provision that expressly provided for the recovery 
of damages by an individual injured by a willful violation of the stay.47 This 
new provision, § 362(h), was enacted under a subtitle entitled “Consumer 
Credit Amendments,”48 a collection of “consumer amendments intended to 
 
 43 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2570–72 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006)). 
 44 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.LH[4][b] (noting that recovery for willful infringement was added with 
the 1984 amendment). Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 § 101, 92 Stat. at 2570–72, with Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 304, 98 Stat. 333, 352. 
 45 See Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 
F.2d 1098, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Prior to the enactment in 1984 of [§ 362(h), which is now § 362(k)], . . . the 
standard that governed the imposition of sanctions [for a violation of an automatic stay] was that which 
governed contempt proceedings . . . .”); COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[2]. 
 46 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 47 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 § 304, 98 Stat. at 352. 
 48 See id. 
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deal with individual bankruptcy”49 and “designed to reduce perceived abuses” 
in chapter 7 filings.50 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA) integrated the text of the former § 362(h) into what is now 
§ 362(k)(1).51 BAPCPA also added § 362(k)(2), which limits the damages that 
may be recovered under subsection (k)(1) to actual damages as long as the 
creditor violated the stay under the good faith belief that the stay had been 
terminated under § 362(h).52 
Section 362(k) states: 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an individual injured by any 
willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual 
damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 
(2) If such violation is based on an action taken by an entity in the 
good faith belief that subsection (h) applies to the debtor, the 
recovery under paragraph (1) of this subsection against such entity 
shall be limited to actual damages.53 
B. The Automatic Stay and the Trustee’s Role in a Bankruptcy Proceeding 
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, “all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property” become property of the bankruptcy estate.54 At the 
beginning of a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the U.S. trustee appoints a 
bankruptcy trustee55 to act as the bankruptcy estate’s representative.56 This 
 
 49 Sensenich v. Ledyard Nat’l Bank (In re Campbell), 398 B.R. 799, 814 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008) (emphasis 
added) (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.11[3] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2005)). 
 50 Voelkel v. Naylor (In re Voelkel), 322 B.R. 138, 144 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (citing 6 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 707.04 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. 2001)). 
 51 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 305(1)(B), 
441(1)(A), 119 Stat. 23, 79, 114 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006)). 
 52 Id. § 441(1)(B), 119 Stat. at 114 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(2)). 
 53 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (emphasis added). The Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010 also later 
amended § 362, but left § 362(k) unchanged. See Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-327, § 2(a)(12), 124 Stat. 3557, 3558–59. 
 54 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).  
 55 Id. § 701(a)(1). The U.S. trustee appoints the interim trustee who serves, unless the creditors elect a 
trustee. 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 701.01. “Because, in the vast majority of cases, no trustee is elected by 
creditors, the interim trustee usually becomes the permanent trustee for the case.” Id. 
 56 11 U.S.C. § 323(a). This provision must be read together with 28 U.S.C. § 959(a), which states that 
“[t]rustees . . . may be sued . . . with respect to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business 
connected with such property,” and FED. R. BANKR. P. 6009, which states that “the trustee or debtor in 
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trustee must do “whatever is necessary to advance [the bankruptcy estate’s] 
interests,”57 including accounting for all property received, collecting and 
liquidating the estate’s property, investigating the debtor’s financial affairs, 
and providing information requested by a party-in-interest.58 
A chapter 7 trustee’s primary duty is to bring as much property into the 
bankruptcy estate as possible, sell this property, and distribute the proceeds to 
unsecured creditors.59 Any property that is not exempt from the estate is 
liquidated, and its value is distributed to unsecured creditors under the 
direction of the trustee.60 
Although the trustee has authority to represent the estate and dispose of the 
property that makes up the estate,61 he does so subject to certain limitations. 
First, the trustee cannot liquidate property that the debtor has claimed as 
exempt, unless the exemption claim is disallowed.62 Second, he usually does 
not liquidate property that has no value to the estate, including the debtor’s 
personal belongings.63 Lastly, the trustee is strongly discouraged from 
liquidating assets that only have nominal value.64 
Immediately upon a debtor’s filing for bankruptcy, the automatic stay takes 
effect, enjoining creditors from taking any action against the debtor, his 
 
possession may prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending action or proceeding by or 
against the debtor, or commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate before any 
tribunal.” 
 57 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.03.  
 58 11 U.S.C. § 704(a) (outlining the duties of the trustee in a chapter 7 case). Section 704 does not 
directly control the duties of trustees in chapter 11, 12, or 13 cases, but most of a chapter 7 trustee’s duties are 
incorporated by reference in chapters 11, 12, and 13. See id. §§ 1106(a)(1), 1202(b)(1), 1302(b)(1). In 
addition, a chapter 11 debtor in possession must perform duties similar to many of a chapter 7 trustee’s duties. 
See id. § 1107(a). 
 59 See id. § 704(a)(1).  
 60 See id. § 507(a) (setting out the distribution priority of unsecured claims). 
 61 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 323.01. 
 62 See In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the trustee was not entitled to take 
possession of debtors’ home, which was partially exempt, until debtors received the value of the homestead 
exemption in cash). Section 522 allows, in many bankruptcy cases, an individual debtor to “claim exemptions 
sufficient to remove all unencumbered property from the bankruptcy estate.” 4 COLLIER, supra note 3, 
¶ 522.01 (emphasis added). The types of property that the debtor may typically exempt include the debtor’s 
residence, an automobile, household furnishings, and property used in the debtor’s trade or business. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(d). 
 63 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]; see also Noland v. Williamson (In re Williamson), 94 B.R. 958, 
963 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Landreneau, 74 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1987). 
 64 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]; see also In re Preston Lumber Corp., 199 B.R. 415, 416 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 1996). 
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property, and the bankruptcy estate’s exempt and non-exempt property.65 A 
creditor violates the stay if it attempts to enforce a lien against property, 
repossess property, harass the debtor, or obtain payment from the debtor.66 A 
creditor may, however, seek relief from the automatic stay to pursue its 
remedies.67 Otherwise, any intentional act that violates the stay is “willful,” 
regardless of whether the creditor had malice or specific intent to violate the 
stay.68 If a creditor violates the stay, § 362(k)(1) allows an individual injured 
by a willful violation of the stay to recover damages, including punitive 
damages, from the violating creditor.69 
Although any unresolved rights of action arising from the contracts or 
property of the debtor pass to the trustee, including a cause of action for a 
violation of the automatic stay,70 the trustee should not “bring suit[s] for a 
small recovery that would not prove to be of net benefit to the estate.”71 “The 
court will respect the trustee’s business judgment in deciding that it is not 
worth pursuing assets that are limited or difficult to collect.”72 Because the 
trustee represents the estate rather than himself or the debtor in any such case, 
any award of damages adds to the property of the estate73 and is thus available 
for distribution to creditors.74 
The automatic stay has two primary purposes.75 First, by stopping “all 
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions,” “[i]t gives the 
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors.” 76 This respite enables the debtor 
to resolve his debts through repayment, liquidation, or reorganization.77 At the 
 
 65 See 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 38.02[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
2012). 
 66 1 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 1.05[1]. 
 67 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.07 [1]. 
 68 Id. ¶ 362.12[3]. 
 69 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006). 
 70 Section 323(b) provides the trustee “with the authority and discretion to prosecute, defend or settle, if 
appropriate in its judgment, causes of action that existed at the time the order for relief was entered.” COLLIER, 
supra note 3, ¶ 323.01; see also 11 U.S.C. § 323(b). 
 71 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.03. 
 72 Id.; see also Frostbaum v. Ochs, 277 B.R. 470, 475 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 73 See Ellis v. Emery (In re Upland Partners), 93 F. App’x 166, 168 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he sanction was 
for the benefit of the estate . . . .”). 
 74 See supra text accompanying note 60 (“Any property that is not exempt from the estate is liquidated, 
and its value is distributed to unsecured creditors under the direction of the trustee.”); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 507(a) (setting out the distribution priority of unsecured claims). 
 75 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. 
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same time, it protects property that may be necessary for the debtor to have a 
fresh start.78 Second, the stay protects creditors by preserving the estate and 
ensuring “an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated 
equally.”79 In this way, the automatic stay protects the trustee’s ability to 
control the liquidation of the property of the estate that he represents. 
C. Violating the Automatic Stay as Contempt of Court 
Prior to the introduction of what is now codified as § 362(k), courts used 
their contempt power under § 105 to punish violations of the stay.80 A 
violation of the automatic stay constitutes contempt of court because the 
automatic stay is a specific and definite court order.81 
Section 105 grants courts independent statutory powers to award 
compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees for contempt of court to the extent 
that such awards are “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the provisions of 
the Code.82 Section 105(a) states:83 
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of 
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest 
shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any 
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to 
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of 
process.84 
The remedies available under § 362(k) differ from the remedies under § 105(a) 
in three ways. 
 
 78 See id.; COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.03. 
 79 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; COLLIER, supra note 3, 
¶ 362.03; see also Martino v. First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 
435 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 80 See Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 
F.2d 1098, 1104 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Prior to the enactment [of § 362(k)], . . . the standard that governed the 
imposition of sanctions was that which governed contempt proceedings: a party generally would not have 
sanctions imposed for its violation of an automatic stay as long as it had acted without maliciousness and had 
had a good faith argument and belief that its actions did not violate the stay.”). 
 81 See Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996).  
 82 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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First, damages for a willful violation of the stay are mandatory under 
§ 362(k), whereas they are discretionary under § 105(a).85 The Ninth Circuit in 
In re Goodman noted this to be the primary difference between § 362(k) 
damages and § 105(a) civil contempt damages.86 
Second, under § 362(k), a court can use its discretion in awarding punitive 
damages for a stay violation, whereas punitive damages are not available under 
the civil contempt remedies of § 105(a).87 The contempt authority conferred on 
bankruptcy courts pursuant to § 105(a) is a civil authority, thus allowing only 
sanctions associated with civil contempt.88 In this regard, the language of 
§ 105(a) does not explicitly grant the authority to award punitive damages. 
Rather, the language authorizes only those remedies “necessary” to enforce the 
Code.89 The sanctions associated with civil contempt—compensatory damages, 
attorneys’ fees, and the offending creditor’s compliance with the automatic 
stay—meet that goal, rendering punitive sanctions unnecessary.90 
Third, the procedural requirements of civil contempt under § 105(a), 
including the standard of proof, are tougher than those of § 362(k).91 To 
recover under § 105(a), a party must prove that the creditor knew of the stay 
and intentionally committed the act in violation of the stay.92 Section 362(k) 
 
 85 See Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. 
LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990); Wagner v. Ivory (In re Wagner), 
74 B.R. 898, 902–03 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).  
 86 Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 1993).  
 87 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12; see also Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 
1539, 1559 (11th Cir. 1996); Henkel v. Lickman (In re Lickman), 297 B.R. 162, 195 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) 
(“Section 105(a), on the other hand, provides no authority for the imposition of punitive damages for 
violations of the automatic stay.” (citing In re Jove Eng’g, Inc., 92 F.3d at 1559)).  
 88 Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 89 Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Sosne v. Reinert & 
Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that Congress 
did not expressly grant “the power to punish” through punitive sanctions under § 105(a)).  
 90 Walls, 276 F.3d at 507.  
 91 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[3] (“[T]he imposition of a remedy under a civil contempt procedure 
may be subject to a stricter standard than is imposed by section 362(k) and does not afford the availability of 
punitive, in addition to compensatory, damages.”); but see id. (“[A]lthough the standards and procedures for 
contempt may be slightly more demanding, courts have had little difficulty dealing with and punishing stay 
violations even without the availability of section 362(k). There is little reason to adopt a tortured reading of 
the statute in order to provide corporate or partnership debtors or trustees with a remedy for stay violations.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 92 Stockschlaeder & McDonald, Esqs. v. Kittay (In re Stockbridge Funding Corp.), 145 B.R. 797, 805 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (setting forth two requirements for finding civil contempt as being: (1) creditor must 
have knowledge of specific, precise order of bankruptcy court; and (2) creditor must knowingly violate that 
order of bankruptcy court), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 158 B.R. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). These requirements 
are the same in the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. 
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does not require any showing of specific intent to violate the stay.93 In contrast, 
to recover under § 105(a), a party must prove that the creditor who violated the 
automatic stay had a “malicious intent or lack of good faith,” a much tougher 
standard than under § 362(k).94 
II. INTERPRETATION OF § 362(K) 
For a trustee or any other entity to recover damages under § 362(k), the 
party must fall within § 362(k)’s meaning of “individual injured.”95 
That is, any party eligible to recover under the statute must satisfy two 
criteria: the party must not only be an “individual,” but also be “injured.” The 
definitional scope for each of these terms is addressed below. 
A. “Individual” as Used in § 362(k) Includes Only Natural Persons 
The first determination is what Congress’ intended definition of 
“individual” is. The Supreme Court has not specifically interpreted 
“individual” in the context of § 362(k), but its approach to statutory 
interpretation suggests that the term includes only natural persons. A trustee, in 
his capacity as the representative of the estate, is not a natural person. Thus, a 
trustee is not an individual for the purposes of the statute. 
Although some courts addressing this issue have only focused on the term 
“individual,”96 the term “injured” is equally important. Even if a trustee is an 
individual, he cannot recover damages under § 362(k) if he is not also injured. 
Few courts have dealt directly with the issue of whether a trustee is an 
individual under § 362(k).97 Because the Code does not define “individual,” 
 
Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 F.2d 1098, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990); Cuffee v. Atl. 
Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. 
v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 293 (4th Cir. 1986); Putnam v. Rymes Heating Oils, Inc. (In re 
Putnam), 167 B.R. 737, 740 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (citing Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 
991 F.2d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 93 Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 907 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008) (citing Price v. 
United States (In re Price), 42 F.3d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994)); Surette, supra note 40, § 2[a] (“The 
willfulness element [of the automatic stay] goes to the deliberateness of the act that violated the stay, and not 
to a specific intent to violate the automatic stay.”). 
 94 Shadduck v. Rodolakis, 221 B.R. 573, 580 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 95 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2006). 
 96 See Surette, supra note 40, § 2[a]. 
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courts interpreting § 362(k) have had considerable trouble determining whom 
Congress intended to include within the scope of this provision and are split as 
to its meaning.98 Currently, the majority interprets “individual” to include a 
trustee, while a minority holds that a trustee is not an individual because the 
term only includes natural persons. However, a greater number of courts have 
addressed the analogous issue of whether a corporation is an individual under 
§ 362(k).99  
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the meaning of 
“individual” as used in the Code, the Court has tangentially addressed the term 
while interpreting other parts of the Code100 and has determined the meaning 
of “individual” in contexts outside of bankruptcy law.101 
1. Statutory Interpretation Using Supreme Court Precedent 
Determining whether a trustee is an “individual” within the meaning of 
§ 362(k) is a question of statutory interpretation to be answered in accordance 
with principles that the Supreme Court has applied when interpreting the Code. 
The Court’s textual approach to statutory interpretation requires an 
examination of the plain meaning of “individual.” 
 
 97 See Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1995) (“There is no controlling 
authority from this or any other circuit that answer the question [of whether a trustee is an individual under 
§ 362(k)].”).  
 98 The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that non-natural persons, specifically trustees or 
corporations, are not individuals. See Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(corporate debtor); Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 
1996) (trustee); In re Pace, 67 F.3d at 193 (trustee); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 
F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (corporate debtor); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re 
Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186–87 (2d Cir. 1990) (corporate debtor). However, the Third Circuit holds 
that a trustee is an individual. Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 
F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990).  
 99 See generally David Swarthout, Note, When Is an Individual a Corporation?—When the Court 
Misinterprets a Statute, That’s When!, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 151 (2000). 
 100 The Supreme Court tangentially addressed the meaning of “individual” in Toibb v. Radloff when it 
interpreted the term “person.” Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160–61 (1991). The Court concluded that the 
petitioner could be a chapter 11 debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) because the Code defines “person” as used in 
title 11 to include an “individual” and § 109(d) does not expressly preclude an “individual” from filing under 
chapter 11. Id. 
 101 Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (interpreting the meaning of “individual” in 
the Torture Victim Protection Act), aff’d sub nom. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012); see 
also In re North, 12 F.3d 252, 254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (interpreting the meaning of “individual” 
in the Ethics in Government Act using the ordinary approach and finding that “individual” describes a “natural 
person”). 
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Beginning with its decision in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 
the Supreme Court has applied a “plain meaning” approach to answer 
questions of statutory interpretation arising under the Code.102 In Ron Pair, the 
Court held that any analysis of the Code must start “where all such inquiries 
must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”103 
Although the limits of what resources should be considered when 
determining the plain meaning of a term are unresolved,104 a purely textual 
analysis of a term’s plain meaning likely considers only the following: (1) the 
text of the statute itself; (2) statutory definitions of the term; (3) definitions 
from relevant dictionaries; and (4) how other sections of the same statute use 
the term.105 If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous after such an 
inquiry, then “the inquiry should end” at that point because “the sole function 
of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.”106 
In determining an undefined term’s plain meaning, the Court has 
established that a court must first examine the text of the statute itself, paying 
close attention to the statute’s word choice107 and grammatical structure.108 
Section 362(k)(1) states, “[A]n individual injured by any willful violation of a 
stay . . . shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees.”109 
The following two maxims of statutory interpretation should guide the analysis 
at this stage: (1) the statute “must give effect to every word of a statute 
wherever possible”;110 and (2) because Congress carefully selects every word 
in a statute, if Congress intended to convey a particular purpose or result, it 
would have explicitly done so.111 
 
 102 See generally Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011); Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 
S. Ct. 2464, 2471 (2010); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757–59 (1992); United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).  
 103 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241. 
 104 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 41, at 189. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and 
Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Nicholas S. 
Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).  
 105 Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 41, at 189. 
 106 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). 
 107 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724 (“[A court] must give effect to every word of a statute wherever possible.” 
(quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004))). 
 108 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (examining the placement of commas in the statute). 
 109 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 110 See Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724 (quoting Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12). 
 111 See id. (citing Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gallatin State Bank, 173 B.R. 146, 147–
48 (N.D. Ill. 1992).  
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For example, in Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., the Court applied 
these two maxims when it interpreted the meaning of “applicable” to determine 
the debtor’s projected “disposable income” in a chapter 13 case.112 First, the 
Court reasoned, “If Congress had not wanted to separate in this way debtors 
who qualify for an allowance from those who do not, it could have omitted the 
term ‘applicable’ altogether.”113 Second, the deliberate use of the word 
“applicable” led the Court to conclude that “Congress presumably included 
[the term] to achieve a different result.”114 The Court’s Ransom opinion 
demonstrates the type of analysis that should be used to interpret § 362(k). 
With respect to the first maxim, one must assume that Congress used the 
word “individual,” instead of the broader term “entity,” in a deliberate manner. 
The terms “individual” and “entity” both appear in § 362(k), as amended. 
However, it is important to note that § 101, the definitional section of the 
Code, specifically defines “entity” but does not define “individual.” Had 
Congress intended to permit parties other than a natural person to recover 
under § 362(k), it presumably would have used the term “entity,” which 
includes trustees under § 101,115 instead of “individual,” which is not 
defined.116 Presumably, Congress recognized the distinction between the two 
terms when it used both “entity” and “individual”117 in the amended version of 
§ 362(k).118 With respect to the second maxim, if Congress had intended 
§ 362(k) to allow trustees, in addition to individual debtors, to recover 
damages under § 362(k), it would have used the broader term “entity,” which 
explicitly permits such recovery.119 
 
 112 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724–25.  
 113 Id. at 724. 
 114 Id. 
 115 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (2006) (“The term ‘entity’ includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and 
United States trustee.” (emphasis added)). 
 116 See In re Sayeh, 445 B.R. 19, 27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011). 
 117 Gecker v. Gierczyk (In re Glenn), 379 B.R. 760, 763–64 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (“The addition of 
‘entity’ in such close proximity to ‘individual’ is strong evidence that Congress was aware of the distinction 
between the terms and deliberately chose to retain the more narrow term in the new section 362(k)(1).”). 
 118 Congress used the term “entity” in § 362(k)(2), which BAPCPA added to § 362(k) in 2005, but 
Congress did not amend the term “individual” as used in § 362(k)(1). See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 441(1), 119 Stat. 23, 114 (codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. § 362(k)(1)–(2)).  
 119 See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gallatin State Bank, 173 B.R. 146, 147–48 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“If Congress 
had intended to make Section 362(h) [include corporations or trustees], it would have done so more clearly.”). 
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After examining the overall text of the statute itself, a court should next 
look to the statutory definitions of the term.120 Any interpretation of the term 
“individual” must begin with § 101 of the Code, which defines numerous terms 
that the Code uses.121 Unfortunately, § 101 does not explicitly define 
“individual.” Thus, in this situation, a court would proceed to consult relevant 
external dictionaries for definitions of the terms at issue.122 
Although the Supreme Court often consults various dictionaries for the 
purposes of statutory interpretation, it has not held one to be more reliable than 
the others. The Court has previously consulted the Standard Dictionary, 
Webster’s Third International Dictionary, the New Oxford American 
Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary, and Black’s Law Dictionary to 
determine the common dictionary definition of the disputed term.123 
According to Webster’s Third International Dictionary, “individual” means 
“a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution.”124 
Similarly, the New Oxford American Dictionary defines an “individual” to be 
“a single human being as distinct from a group, class, or family.”125 An aspect 
common to both dictionaries’ definitions is that an individual is a “human 
being.” This analysis of the dictionaries’ definitions leads to the conclusion 
that the term “individual” only includes natural persons and does not include 
non-natural persons and other entities like trustees. 
If the plain meaning of the term is still unclear after following these steps, a 
court may next consider how the disputed term is used in other sections of the 
same statute.126 The term’s usage in other portions of the same statute is 
significant because “a word is presumed to have the same meaning in all 
 
 120 See Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011); In re A & C Electric Co., 188 B.R. 
975, 980 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Divane v. A & C Electric Co., 193 B.R. 856 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 121 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101. 
 122 See In re A & C Electric Co., 188 B.R. at 980 (“Since Congress did not define ‘individual’ in the 
Bankruptcy Code, its use of that word can be read according to its common dictionary meaning . . . .”). 
 123 Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 724. 
 124 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1152 (2002). 
 125 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 865 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., 2001). Black’s 
Law Dictionary only defines the adjective form of “individual,” not the noun form. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 843 (9th ed. 2009).  
 126 See KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 21 (2008); see also Cohen v. De La 
Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998) (noting that there is a presumption that “equivalent words have equivalent 
meaning when repeated in the same statute”); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 n.2 (1992) (“[A] word 
is presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute.” (quoting Morrison-Knudsen 
Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983))). 
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subsections of the same statute.”127 Thus, in this case, a complete analysis 
requires an examination of how “individual” is used in the parts of § 362 and 
the Code that were already enacted when Congress introduced § 362(k). 
The use of “individual” in other sections of the Code suggests that the term 
does not include a trustee and only includes natural persons. Even though the 
Code does not explicitly define “individual,” the term “individual” is used in 
other definitions in § 101.128 For example, § 101(15) defines the term “entity” 
to include a “person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States 
trustee,”129 and § 101(41) defines the term “person” as including an 
“individual, partnership, and corporation.”130 Replacing § 101(41)’s definition 
of “person” for the word “person” in § 101(15)’s definition of “entity” creates 
a clearer and more comprehensive definition of “entity.” After making this 
substitution, the definition of “entity” includes an individual, partnership, 
corporation, estate, trust, governmental unit, and U.S. trustee.131 
Because statutes should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid 
superfluity,132 an analysis of the definition of “entity” sheds additional light on 
the meaning of “individual” under § 362(k). Since the definition of “entity” 
lists the terms “individual,” “trustee,” and “estate” separately, these three terms 
should be read as being mutually exclusive to avoid superfluity. As such, an 
“individual” cannot encompass a “trustee” or an “estate.” 
In addition to the uses of “individual” within § 101, the term “individual” is 
used repeatedly throughout the Code,133 the Bankruptcy Rules,134 and the 
 
 127 Patterson, 504 U.S. at 758 n.2 (quoting Morrison-Knudsen, 461 U.S. at 633); see also Cohen, 523 U.S. 
at 220 (noting that there is a presumption that “equivalent words have equivalent meaning when repeated in 
the same statute”). But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 n.3 (1992) (“[W]e express no opinion as to 
whether the words ‘allowed secured claim’ have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”). 
 128 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2006). 
 129 Id. § 101(15). 
 130 Id. § 101(41). 
 131 See id. § 101(15), (41). 
 132 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2474 (2010) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation 
of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law” (quoting 
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Conn. Nat’l Bank 
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (“Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so 
long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy’ between two laws, a court must give effect to both.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 133 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (defining “consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an individual primarily for a 
personal, family, or household purpose”); id. § 101(44) (defining “railroad” as a mode of travel concerned with 
transportation of “individuals”); id. § 101(45) (defining “relative” as an “individual related by affinity or 
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Official Bankruptcy Forms135 in such a way as to indicate that the intended 
meaning of “individual” is a natural person. For example, § 101(18) defines a 
“family farmer” as an “individual or individual and spouse engaged in a 
farming operation.”136 Of course, only a natural person, not a corporation or a 
bankruptcy estate, can have a spouse. Because the term “individual” is used to 
apply only to natural persons in this instance, it should be construed in the 
same manner throughout the Code.137 
After completing this textual analysis, it follows that the plain meaning of 
“individual,” as used in § 362(k), includes only natural persons. 
2. Is Departing from the Plain Meaning Appropriate? 
In Ron Pair, the Supreme Court held that, “as long as the statutory scheme 
is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire 
beyond the plain language of the statute.”138 The Court explained that the plain 
meaning of the statute should be conclusive, except in those “rare cases [in 
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at 
 
consanguinity within the third degree”); id. § 109(e) (providing that only an “individual” with regular income 
and such individual’s spouse may become a chapter 13 debtor); id. § 365(d)(5) (stating that trustee will timely 
perform all obligations of debtor under unexpired lease of personal property, other than personal property 
“leased to an individual primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”); id. § 507(a)(4) (discussing 
unsecured claims for “each individual or corporation” and providing that priority is given where “wages, 
salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay[, are] earned by an individual”). 
 134 See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (discussing “individuals” under rule entitled “Death or 
Incompetency of Debtor”); id. 5002(a) (stating that an “individual [who] is a relative of the bankruptcy judge” 
cannot be appointed as trustee); id. 7004(b)(1) (providing service on “an individual other than an infant or 
incompetent”).  
 135 See, e.g., VOLUNTARY PETITION, OFFICIAL FORM 1 (04/10), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_001_0410.pdf (distinguishing between 
individual and corporate debtors); INVOLUNTARY PETITION, OFFICIAL FORM 5 (12/07), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_005_1207f.pdf (distinguishing 
between individual and corporate debtors); STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, OFFICIAL FORM 7 (04/10), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_007_ 
0410.pdf (distinguishing between individual and corporate debtors).  
 136 11 U.S.C. § 101(18). 
 137 See Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998) (noting that there is a presumption that 
“equivalent words have equivalent meaning when repeated in the same statute”); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 
U.S. 753, 758 n.2 (1992) (“[A] word is presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same 
statute.” (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983))). But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 n.3 (1992) (“[W]e express 
no opinion as to whether the words ‘allowed secured claim’ have different meaning in other provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 138 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989). 
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odds with the intentions of its drafters.”139 “In such cases, the intention of the 
drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”140 
The Court has ruled in such a way in other cases to show that “even the 
most ardent textualist might compromise his principles of statutory 
interpretation” if the policy at stake is overwhelmingly important141 or if using 
the strict plain meaning would produce an absurd result.142 On the other hand, 
if the plain meaning is not clear, a court should look to the general purpose of 
the provision, the policy behind its enactment, subsequent and prior law, and 
its legislative history to determine the meaning of the disputed term.143 
A textualist would likely conclude that the plain meaning of “individual” in 
§ 362(k) is unambiguous and includes only natural persons. Furthermore, this 
interpretation does not produce an absurd result and is consistent with both the 
rest of the automatic stay provision and the rest of the Code.144 As discussed 
later, this interpretation of § 362(k) reflects Congress’s intent for the term 
“individual” in § 362(k) to be limited to natural persons. 
The plain meaning analysis ends here. A court will continue its analysis 
only if the plain meaning is unclear.145 Some lower courts have reasoned that 
the plain meaning is unclear because the term “individual” is not expressly 
 
 139 Id. at 242 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 
(1982)). 
 140 Id. 
 141 KLEE, supra note 126, at 31; see BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1994). In 
interpreting § 548’s use of the phrase “reasonably equivalent value,” Justice Scalia wrote that, “absent clearer 
textual guidance than the phrase ‘reasonably equivalent value’—a phrase entirely compatible with pre-existing 
practice,” the Court would not depart from real estate mortgage foreclosure practices that had existed for over 
400 years. Id. 
 142 See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (finding 
that it is well established that “when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms” (quoting Ron 
Pair, 489 U.S. at 241) (internal quotation marks omitted)); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (non-bankruptcy case).  
 143 See KLEE, supra note 126, at 17. Regardless of whether the plain meaning is clear, recent Supreme 
Court decisions have applied a more liberal plain meaning approach than the one endorsed in Ron Pair and 
have looked to whether the statute’s purpose and legislative history lend to their interpretation of a term’s 
original meaning. See generally Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011); Hamilton v. 
Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). In Ransom, the Court considered whether “BAPCPA’s purpose strengthen[ed 
its] reading of the term ‘applicable.’” Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725. 
 144 See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 184 (2d 
Cir. 1990).  
 145 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241. 
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defined in the Code.146 Thus, such plain meaning should not be exclusively 
relied on to resolve the precise issue under consideration. 
Even if the plain meaning of “individual” is supposedly clear, the 
interpretational analysis should not necessarily end here because the plain 
meaning approach is not always reliable.147 Critics of the plain meaning 
approach have long complained that the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Code in an inconsistent manner.148 Indeed, some critics have skeptically 
pointed out that the Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence “[a]dopt[s] a ‘plain 
meaning’ posture where the language of the statute meets with judicial 
approval, and use[s] legislative intent to contradict the language of the statute 
where a literal reading is not kind to the desired result.”149 
If the meaning of “individual” under § 362(k) were so “plain” that it 
“cannot be read in any other way,”150 then this issue would not have split the 
circuits. Any split should, at a minimum, cause a reasonable court to reflect on 
how the divergent interpretations arose and to examine the validity and 
relevance of the reasons supporting the divergent interpretations.151 
 
 146 See, e.g., Bohm v. Howard (In re Howard), 428 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
United Bank, Inc. v. Howard (In re Howard), No. 2:10CV962, 2011 WL 578777 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2011). 
 147 While the Supreme Court currently endorses the plain meaning approach, the results under this 
analysis are inconsistent. Logically, any case of statutory interpretation that goes to the Supreme Court due to a 
split in meaning among the circuits suggests that the meaning is unclear. For example, in Hamilton v. Lanning, 
the Court used the plain meaning approach to interpret the term “projected” in BAPCPA’s projected 
disposable income test. Hamilton, 130 S. Ct. at 2471–72. They concluded that “projected” implied that a 
bankruptcy court has discretion to make appropriate adjustments to income where significant changes in a 
debtor’s financial circumstances are virtually certain. Id. at 2472. However, the fact that lower circuit courts 
reached the opposite conclusion after applying the plain meaning approach when interpreting this term 
suggests the test is unreliable. Id. at 2473.  
 148 See, e.g., Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 
BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 301–09 (1994); Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: 
Eight Years of Judicial Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1988); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence 
Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6, 
109–10 (1996); Bruce A. Markell, Conspiracy, Literalism, and Ennui at the Supreme Court: An Examination 
of Bankruptcy Cases Decided from 1990 to 1993, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 174, 181–82 (1994); Charles Jordan 
Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the 
Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 879–85 (1991); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act 
in the Supreme Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 570–75 (1988). 
 149 See Klee & Merola, supra note 148, at 2. 
 150 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242. In Ron Pair, the court determined that the plain meaning of § 506(b) was 
clear based on the placement of the commas in the statute. Id. at 241–42. “[T]hat the Congress should or could 
contemplate . . . a decisive change in law [regarding this statute according to punctuation is] an entirely 
unrealistic view of the precision of . . . congressional drafting . . . .” Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A 
Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 897 (2000). 
 151 See Bussel, supra note 150, at 896–97.  
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Consistency is especially important in bankruptcy law because the Code has a 
pervasive effect on society. Thus, it may be appropriate to buttress the 
statutory interpretation of “individual” by looking to resources beyond the 
plain meaning of the text. 
3. Expanding Statutory Interpretation Beyond the Plain Meaning 
While the Supreme Court in Ron Pair based its ruling on its determination 
of the statute’s plain meaning,152 the Court has, in other cases, examined 
additional evidence to confirm its interpretation. Here, this Comment 
summarizes what other evidence the Court has used at this stage. This 
Comment then applies this expanded analysis to argue that “individual” as 
used in § 362(k) should be interpreted so as to not include trustees and to only 
include natural persons. 
The Court notes that, “[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by 
a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the 
whole law, and to its object and policy.”153 First, to aid its interpretation of a 
disputed term’s plain meaning, the Court has often considered how the term is 
used in areas outside of the statute.154 For example, in Hamilton v. Lanning, the 
Court looked at how the disputed term was used in other legal contexts, such as 
other federal statutes.155 Second, the Court has referred to prior law, the 
development of the law, and the law’s legislative history in an attempt to glean 
Congress’s intent in drafting the statute.156 Lastly, the Court has also looked to 
the overall purpose and policy behind the statute to lend additional insight to 
 
 152 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242–43. 
 153 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 
207, 222 (1986)); see also Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (“[C]ommon sense 
suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it.”); Bank of Marin 
v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (“[W]e do not read these statutory words with the ease of a computer. 
There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”); 
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940) (“When aid to construction of the 
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its 
use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 154 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2471–72 (2010).  
 155 Id. at 2472. Furthermore, in interpreting the meaning of the word “projected,” the Court in Hamilton 
considered what projections were used in business law, politics, and even sports. Id. at 2471–72. 
 156 KLEE, supra note 126, at 17 (“Even when the language of the statute is clear, courts must consider the 
legislative history and issues of policy and previous practice to determine congressional intent.”). Generally, 
when the Code does not supply a definition for a particular statutory term, the court “turn[s] to the legislative 
history in an attempt to glean congressional intent.” La. Dep’t of Revenue & Taxation v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 
199 F.3d 249, 251–52 (5th Cir. 2000).  
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its reading of the disputed term.157 An analysis of these types of evidence 
demonstrates that the term “individual” under § 362(k) only includes a natural 
person. 
First, an examination of the use of “individual” in other federal statutes 
suggests that “individual” means only a natural person. For example, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the word 
“individual” in the Torture Victim Protection Act to encompass only natural 
persons.158 Another federal statute, the Dictionary Act, which provides 
guidance in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,”159 has directed 
courts to presume that the use of “individual” in a statute refers to natural 
persons and not corporations or trustees.160 
Second, the evolution of the Code and the Code’s legislative history 
suggest that the term “individual” means only a natural person. In deciphering 
the congressional intent behind the Code, the Court has held that, as a matter of 
statutory construction, courts should examine prior law and the development of 
the statute because the Code shall not be read so as “to erode past bankruptcy 
practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure.”161 
For example, in Hamilton, the Court examined bankruptcy practice existing 
prior to the enactment of BAPCPA to determine the meaning of a provision 
that BAPCPA added.162 Because Congress did not amend the meaning of the 
term at issue via BAPCPA, the Court defined the term in accordance with the 
interpretation espoused by pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice.163 The Court 
 
 157 See Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 725 (2011) (considering “BAPCPA’s purpose to 
strengthen [its] reading of the term ‘applicable’”). 
 158 Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Mohamad v. Palestinian 
Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012); cf. In re North, 12 F.3d 252, 254–55 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that 
“individual” as used in the Ethics in Government Act means a natural person based on the term’s ordinary 
meaning). 
 159 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 160 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Mohamad, 634 F.3d at 
607. The Dictionary Act defines “person” to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, . . . as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). 
 161 Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990) (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 
36, 47 (1986)), superseded by statute, Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 
2865, as recognized in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); accord, e.g., Cohen v. De La Cruz, 
523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998); United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 221 
(1996); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 244–45 (1989); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988). 
 162 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2472–74 (2010). 
 163 Id. at 2474. 
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concluded that, if Congress intended for the term to have another meaning, 
“Congress would have said so expressly” in BAPCPA.164 
The evolution of § 362(k) suggests that “individual” does not include 
trustees. The split among the circuits on whether “individual” should be 
construed to include trustees emerged prior to the enactment of BAPCPA. 
Despite this existing uncertainty, BAPCPA’s amendment of the former 
§ 362(h) did not change “individual” to a more inclusive and definite term such 
as “person” or “entity.”165 Congress failed again to broaden the term when it 
subsequently passed the Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, which 
corrected drafting errors and other problems with BAPCPA and amended 
§ 362.166 Thus, following the Court’s reasoning in Hamilton,167 if Congress 
had wanted to broaden the scope and availability of § 362(k) remedies to more 
than just natural persons, it would have explicitly done so by correcting the 
statute to include a broader term such as entity. 
The legislative history of the overall Code is another valuable indicator of 
the meaning of “individual.” Even though § 362(k) was not enacted as a part of 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the legislative history leading to the 
Code’s original enactment is relevant. The Senate Report to the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 provides that chapter 11 “is primarily designed for 
businesses, although individuals are eligible for relief under the chapter.”168 
The Senate Report shows that, even at the Code’s inception, Congress intended 
for “corporations” and “individuals” to be mutually exclusive terms.169 
Lastly, a complete statutory interpretation of the term “individual” would 
include an analysis of the purpose of § 362(k), which requires consideration of 
not only the purpose and policy of the overarching section, but also the 
purpose of the specific subsection at issue. 
In Budget Service Company v. Better Homes of Virginia, Inc., the Fourth 
Circuit considered only the overall purpose of the automatic stay, rather than 
the specific purpose of § 362(k), when it assessed whether a non-natural person 
 
 164 Id. 
 165 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§§ 305(1)(B), 441(1)(A), 119 Stat. 23, 79, 114 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1)). 
 166 See generally Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557. 
 167 See supra text accompanying notes 162–64. 
 168 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5789. 
 169 See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 3, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5789). 
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is an individual under § 362(k).170 After noting that the purpose of the 
automatic stay was to provide all debtors relief from harassment from 
creditors, the Fourth Circuit held that it was unlikely that Congress intended 
the provision to apply to only individual debtors when the policy behind the 
stay was so broad.171 However, the Fourth Circuit’s approach did not take into 
account the possibility that the purpose of § 362(k) may have been narrower 
than the overall purpose of the automatic stay provision. 
Although the overall purpose of § 362 is broad enough to warrant 
application to both natural and non-natural persons, the purpose of § 362(k) is 
likely much narrower.172 As mentioned earlier in this Comment, § 362(k) was 
not originally enacted in 1978 as a part of § 362 and was introduced into § 362 
as a part of the Consumer Credit Amendments, a specifically tailored group of 
amendments found in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 
of 1984.173 The Consumer Credit Amendments applied only to natural 
persons,174 thus suggesting that “the use of the word ‘individual’ was 
intentional, and that Congress was enacting a series of measures meant to 
benefit only natural persons.”175 Indeed, several courts ruling that trustees 
cannot invoke § 362(k) have used this reasoning to support their 
conclusions.176 
While the policy behind § 362 calls for a broad application of the provision, 
the legislative history and construction of § 362 do not necessarily apply to 
subsection (k).177 Rather, “Congress may have viewed natural persons as 
particularly vulnerable to violations of the automatic stay” and drafted § 362(k) 
to provide a “precise, easily applied, private cause of action to vindicate [their] 
 
 170 Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir.1986) (corporate debtor). 
 171 Id. (“[I]t seems unlikely that Congress meant to give a remedy only to individual debtors against those 
who willfully violate the automatic stay provisions of the Code as opposed to debtors which are corporations 
or other like entities. Such a narrow construction of the term would defeat much of the purpose of the 
section . . . .”). 
 172 See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186 (2d 
Cir. 1990).  
 173 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 304, 98 Stat. 333, 
352. 
 174 “The term ‘consumer debt’ means debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or 
household purpose.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2006). Non-natural persons would have no debt for a “personal, 
family, or household purpose.” See id. 
 175 In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 186. 
 176 See, e.g., id. 
 177 See id. 
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rights, consistent with the consumer protection goals of the statute.”178 On the 
other hand, Congress may have viewed trustees and other entities, such as 
corporations, as “more likely to already know their rights under the bankruptcy 
law” because they are repeat players in the system.179 
B. Trustee Is Not a Natural Person 
Pursuant to the above analysis, the term “individual” as used in § 362(k) 
should be interpreted to include only natural persons. A trustee is not a natural 
person because the trustee is acting not in his personal capacity, but in his 
professional capacity as a representative of a bankruptcy estate, which is not a 
natural person. Thus, the trustee should not be considered an “individual” 
eligible to recover damages under § 362(k). 
Under § 541(a), the commencement of a bankruptcy case “creates an 
estate.”180 A trustee is appointed to act as that estate’s representative.181 
Section 321(a), which outlines the eligibility requirements to serve as a trustee, 
provides that “[a] person may serve as a trustee in a case under this title only if 
such person is—(1) an individual that is competent to perform the duties of 
trustee . . . ; or (2) a corporation authorized by such corporation’s charter or 
bylaws to act as trustee.”182 
If an individual assumes the role of a trustee as § 321(a) permits, that 
individual is inarguably a natural person in his personal capacity. But, the 
personal status of the individual serving as the trustee should have no bearing 
on the status of his position as a trustee (i.e., a representative of an estate).183 
 
 178 In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 150 B.R. 925, 928 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993). The Court has recognized that 
the rehabilitation of debtors is an overarching policy that animates the Code. See, e.g., Cohen v. De La Cruz, 
523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 
151, 160–62 (1991); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1934). 
 179 In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 150 B.R. at 928 (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 186); see also 
id. (“Similar protections were evidently not deemed necessary for presumably more sophisticated corporations 
capable of fending for themselves.”). 
 180 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006). 
 181 Id. § 323(a). 
 182 Id. § 321(a). At first glance, § 321 could indicate the either/or scenario that, if a trustee is not a 
corporation, the trustee must be considered an individual who would be entitled to recover under § 362(k). See 
Eric Howe, Note, Benefiting the Bankruptcy System Through Deterrence: Allowing a Chapter 7 Trustee to 
Recover Punitive Damages for a Violation of the Automatic Stay Under § 362(h), 90 IOWA L. REV. 1939, 
1961–62 (2005). However, upon closer inspection, this provision merely comments on the status of that person 
(corporation or individual) prior to becoming a trustee and does not preclude the trustee from being an entity 
completely distinct from an individual or a corporation. 
 183 See 11 U.S.C. § 323(a). 
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Serving as the newly created trustee is a professional role filled by the 
individual, distinct from that individual’s personal status.184 Whether a trustee 
is a natural person should not be determined based on his personal status as an 
individual, but on his professional status as a representative of a bankruptcy 
estate.185 
Section 321 bolsters the idea that the trustee, as the estate’s representative, 
should be classified separately from the person (either an individual or a 
corporation) who fills the role of the trustee.186 The concurring opinion in In re 
Pace pointed out that, if the trustee’s classification as an individual or non-
individual was based on his personal status, then a court could award damages 
to a bankruptcy estate represented by a trustee who is an individual, but not to 
an identical bankruptcy estate represented by a corporation.187 Because the 
Code sets forth identical rights and duties for both corporate and individual 
trustees and the estates that they represent, the concurrence noted that “no 
logical reason presents itself why Congress would require [this result].”188 
The distinction between the trustee as the estate’s representative and the 
natural person who fills the role of trustee is further emphasized by the fact 
that a violation of an automatic stay damages the estate’s property, not the 
trustee’s personal property.189 If the trustee were acting in his personal 
capacity, he would have no cause to assert a violation of the automatic stay 
because it is the debtor, not the trustee, who has filed for bankruptcy. The 
bankruptcy courts do not award damages resulting from automatic stay 
violations to the trustee himself, but to the estate.190 
Based on his professional capacity as a representative of a bankruptcy 
estate, a trustee should not be classified as a natural person because an estate is 
 
 184 Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 159 B.R. 890, 905 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (Jellen, J., concurring), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, 67 F.3d 187 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 185 See Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 175 B.R. 288, 291–92 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) (holding that the trustee was not entitled to recover damages under § 362(h) because 
he was acting as the representative of a corporate entity’s bankruptcy estate), rev’d, 108 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
 186 See In re Pace, 159 B.R. at 905–06 (Jellen, J., concurring) (discussing the distinction between the 
debtor and the representative of the estate).  
 187 Id. at 906. This point assumes that corporate debtors are not individuals under § 362(k). This Comment 
will not address this tangential issue. For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see generally Swarthout, 
supra note 99. 
 188 In re Pace, 159 B.R. at 906 (Jellen, J., concurring). 
 189 Id. at 905.  
 190 See id. 
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not a natural person.191 Conversely, a bankruptcy estate should not be 
considered a natural person even though its representative, the trustee, may be 
a natural person in his personal capacity.192 
Throughout the Code, Congress uses the term “individual” to refer to the 
party-in-interest rather than the representative of the party-in-interest.193 Thus, 
according to the rule of statutory construction “that a word is presumed to have 
the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute,”194 the term 
“individual” in § 362(k) refers to the party seeking relief in an automatic stay 
case. 
If the availability of relief under the Code depended on the status of the 
representative and not the party itself, a party would be eligible for relief under 
§ 362(k) as long as the representative of such party was an individual.195 This 
result would completely undermine the Code. 
For example, estates and trusts196 are ineligible for relief under any chapter 
of the Code.197 Section 109(a) provides that “only a person . . . , or a 
municipality, may be a debtor under this title,”198 and § 101(41) provides that 
“[t]he term ‘person’ includes individual, partnership, and corporation,”199 
thereby excluding estates and non-business trusts. The legislative history 
shows that Congress explicitly excluded estates and trusts from the definition 
of “person.”200 Under the flawed rationale that the status of the estate’s 
representative determines eligibility, however, a decedent’s estate would be 
eligible to file for bankruptcy if the executor representing the estate happens to 
 
 191 Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that any damage is incurred 
by a “thing”—the bankruptcy estate—and not by a natural person). 
 192 In re Pace, 159 B.R. at 906 (Jellen, J., concurring) (“[I]t [is] apparent that the term ‘individual’ was 
intended to refer to a natural person injured by a stay relief violation and not to the representative of that 
person.”). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 n.2 (1992) (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983)). 
 195 See In re Pace, 159 B.R. at 906 (Jellen, J., concurring). 
 196 These are trusts other than business trusts that qualify as corporations under § 101(9). 
 197 See, e.g., Goerg v. Parungao (In re Goerg), 844 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988) (decedents’ estates 
ineligible for relief under the Code); In re BKC Realty Trust, 125 B.R. 65, 68 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (family 
trust ineligible for relief). 
 198 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 199 Id. § 101(41). 
 200 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 313 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6270 (“The definition [of 
‘person’] does not include an estate or a trust, which are included only in the definition of ‘entity’ in proposed 
11 U.S.C. [sic] 101(14) [now, § 101(15)].”). 
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be an individual. Similarly, “[c]orporations and partnerships would also enjoy 
an expanded array of rights (e.g., eligibility to file Chapter 13 and claim 
exemptions) in cases where they are represented by a fiduciary who is an 
individual.”201 
Thus, the status of the trustee as a natural person in his personal capacity 
should be of no consequence to determining whether he can recover damages 
under § 362(k). Rather, this question turns on whether the bankruptcy estate, 
which the trustee represents, should be considered an individual. Because the 
bankruptcy estate is not a natural person under § 362(k), the trustee in his 
representative capacity is not an individual. 
C. Trustee Is Not “Injured” for Purposes of § 362(k) 
Regardless of whether a trustee is considered an “individual” under the 
statutory analysis set forth in the previous two subparts, a trustee should not be 
able to recover damages under § 362(k) because the trustee has not been 
“injured” by the violation of the automatic stay as the statute requires.202 
Section 362(k) requires that one must be an “individual injured” to recover 
damages as set forth under the provision.203 Thus, an individual cannot recover 
damages under § 362(k) for a violation of the automatic stay unless that 
individual is also injured by the violation.204 Both requirements must be 
fulfilled simultaneously. As established in the previous subparts, a trustee is an 
individual in his personal capacity and a non-individual in his professional 
capacity as a bankruptcy estate’s representative. Thus, in order for a trustee to 
be considered an injured individual as required under § 362(k), the trustee 
would need to be injured in his personal capacity. 
Even if a trustee is an individual under § 362(k), he is not personally 
injured by the violation of the automatic stay.205 Rather, the estate that the 
 
 201 See Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 159 B.R. 890, 906 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (Jellen, J., concurring), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 67 F.3d 187 (9th Cir. 1995). This case also discusses that, “[b]y the same 
construction, trusts and decedents’ estates represented by an individual fiduciary would not only be eligible for 
relief under the Bankruptcy Code, they would also qualify to claim exemptions pursuant to section 522(b)(1), 
file Chapter 13 cases pursuant to section 109(e), and obtain Chapter 7 discharges pursuant to section 727(a), 
rights that are available only to ‘individuals.’” Id. 
 202 See Martino v. First Nat’l Bank in Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 164 B.R. 955, 972 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 186 B.R. 414 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 203 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). 
 204 See id. 
 205 See In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, 164 B.R. at 972–73.  
GOULD GALLEYS3 6/27/2013 2:17 PM 
494 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
trustee represents is injured. The Ninth Circuit in In re Pace arrived at this very 
conclusion.206 The court first established two facts: (1) any resulting damage 
was suffered by the bankruptcy estate; and (2) the trustee in his individual 
capacity was not a party to the case.207 Because the only party injured in this 
case was the estate, the court reasoned that the only way for the trustee to 
recover damages under § 362(k) was if the bankruptcy estate was considered 
an individual merely because its representative, the trustee, was an individual 
in his personal capacity.208 The Ninth Circuit declined to take such an 
approach.209 
Appellate courts have rejected lower courts’ conclusions that a trustee has 
been injured for the purposes of § 362(k).210 One lower court concluded that 
the trustee, in following its obligations under § 704(1) to recover property 
wrongfully seized by a creditor after the bankruptcy petition had been filed, 
likely suffered a loss in not being able to recover attorneys’ fees from the stay 
violator.211 In response to this argument, courts have reiterated that the loss of 
attorneys’ fees and the like are actually incurred by the bankruptcy estate, 
which is an entity, not an individual.212 Courts have also held that the time 
required of the trustee to file a motion in an automatic stay case is not a type of 
damage intended to be remedied by § 362(k).213 
The conclusion that the trustee is not injured by a stay violation is 
consistent with the distinction between an injured party and that party’s 
representative that courts have made in other areas of law. For example, 
according to an interpretation of Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2), 
beneficiaries that receive funds on account of another individual’s personal 
injuries are not eligible to exclude this income because they have not been 
 
 206 Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 207 See id. at 192–93.  
 208 See id. 
 209 Id. at 193.  
 210 See, e.g., id. 
 211 Martino v. First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 439 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995). 
 212 In re Pace, 67 F.3d at 193 (asserting that, while In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods allows a trustee to fit the 
definition of “individual,” loss in form of attorneys’ fees and costs “is actually incurred by a thing, viz., the 
bankruptcy estate, and not by the trustee as a natural person”). Regardless of whether the harm is incurred by 
the trustee as a representative of an estate or as an individual, recovering under § 362(k) is not necessary to 
rectify any loss incurred because attorneys’ fees are an available form of relief under § 105. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105(a) (2006). 
 213 Lovett v. Honeywell, Inc., 930 F.2d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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personally injured.214 Similar to how a beneficiary represents an injured party 
in receiving the damages, the trustee represents the debtor in an automatic stay 
case. Thus, the trustee is not an injured party, but a representative of the actual 
injured party, the estate. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF PRECLUDING TRUSTEES FROM RECOVERING UNDER 
§ 362(K)—THE AVAILABILITY AND APPROPRIATENESS OF DAMAGES 
At first glance, it may seem that trustees should be treated as “individuals” 
under § 362(k) to avoid a scenario in which creditors can violate the stay with 
impunity “as long as those injured by the violation happen to be entities other 
than natural persons.”215 The argument follows that, if creditors are able to go 
unpunished in this circumstance, it undercuts the purposes of the automatic 
stay216 to provide a “breathing spell” for debtors and to ensure that creditors 
are paid in an equitable manner.217 Thus, the argument continues, the 
bankruptcy system requires a more lenient standard for defining “individual” 
under § 362(k) to impose more damages on violators of the automatic stay218 
and avoid an outcome in which creditors go unpunished and undeterred. 
Indeed, many of the courts holding that trustees and other entities should be 
considered individuals have rationalized that preventing them from recovering 
damages under § 362(k) would be contrary to congressional intent.219 For 
example, the Fourth Circuit in Better Homes of Virginia held that a corporation 
can recover damages for an automatic stay violation under § 362(h) (now 
§ 362(k)) because “it seems unlikely that Congress meant to give a remedy 
only to individual debtors” and “[s]uch a narrow construction of the term 
 
 214 Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Comm’r, 184 F.2d 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1950); see also Estate of Wesson v. 
United States, 843 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (“[T]he beneficiaries cannot seriously contend that 
they received the punitive-damages award ‘on account of personal injuries’ as required under section 104(a)(2) 
for purposes of exclusion from taxation.”), aff’d sub nom. Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
 215 See Howe, supra note 182, at 1955. 
 216 See D. Casey Kobi, Note, Staying True to Purpose: Including Corporate Debtors Under § 362(h) of 
the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 76 IND. L.J. 243, 267 (2001) (“The purpose of § 362(h) will be destroyed if 
creditors can violate the automatic stay without suffering repercussions under the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 217 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97. 
 218 See Howe, supra note 182, at 1954–55.  
 219 See, e.g., Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986); Martino v. 
First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 438–39 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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would defeat much of the purpose of the section.”220 The Fourth Circuit is one 
of only two circuit courts to hold that a non-natural person is an individual.221 
The decision in Better Homes of Virginia and other similar conclusions are 
based on the false assumption that, if a party is unable to recover under 
§ 362(k), the party will be unable to recover any type of damages based on a 
violation of the automatic stay.222 On the contrary, if a trustee is unable to 
recover under § 362(k), that trustee is still entitled to recover damages under 
§ 105’s contempt provision.223 Section 105 provides trustees with an adequate 
recovery, enabling them to receive both compensatory damages and attorneys’ 
fees.224 Indeed, punitive damages are the only form of damages available under 
§ 362(k) that are not available under § 105. 
The fact that punitive damages are not available as a remedy for contempt 
under § 105, however, provides no basis for concluding that a trustee should be 
able to proceed under § 362(k). Awarding punitive damages to a trustee is 
inappropriate because doing so does not further the main policies behind 
punitive damages, which are to deter violations of the stay and to punish 
violators. 
A. Recovery Under § 105 Is Available and Adequate 
Many courts have held that, because an automatic stay constitutes a court 
order, a violation of the stay is punishable as contempt of court.225 Thus, if a 
trustee is not eligible to recover damages under § 362(k), then the trustee may 
 
 220 Better Homes of Va., 804 F.2d at 292. 
 221 The only other circuit to hold that a non-natural person is an individual is the Third Circuit. See Cuffee 
v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990) (corporate 
debtor). The Second Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit have held that non-natural persons, specifically 
trustees or corporations, are not individuals under § 362(k). See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. 
(In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186–87 (2d Cir. 1990) (corporate debtor); Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, 
P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1997) (corporate debtor is not an 
individual); Cal. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(trustee is not an individual); Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (trustee is not 
an individual); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (corporate 
debtor is not an individual). The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts have not 
ruled on this issue yet. 
 222 See Better Homes of Va., 804 F.2d at 292. 
 223 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[2].  
 224 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).  
 225 See, e.g., Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996); In re 
Xavier’s of Beville, Inc., 172 B.R. 667, 671–72 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); Fry v. Today’s Homes, Inc. (In re 
Fry), 122 B.R. 427, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990). 
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still recover damages under § 105.226 Section 105 grants courts the power to 
award compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees for automatic stay violations 
to the extent that such awards are “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the 
provisions of the Code.227 
The fact that the contempt remedy was used for decades to enforce the 
automatic stay suggests that it is an adequate remedy for trustees and other 
non-individuals who are not eligible to recover damages under § 362(k). 
Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act in 1984, which permitted individuals to recover under § 362(h) (now 
§ 362(k)),228 recovery under § 105 was the only means for enforcing the 
automatic stay.229 
Considering that damages for a violation of the stay were available under 
§ 105 for some time, Congress likely passed § 362(h) to offer a unique, 
perhaps narrower, form of recovery.230 The legislative history of § 362(h) 
states that § 362(h) was enacted to offer “an additional right of individual 
debtors, and [was] not intended to foreclose recovery under already existing 
remedies.”231 Several courts, citing the legislative history, have interpreted 
Congress’s intent for § 362(h) to supplement, rather than replace, the contempt 
remedy available under § 105.232 
 
 226 See In re Pace, 67 F.3d at 193; cf. Spookyworld, Inc. v. Town of Berlin (In re Spookyworld, Inc.), 346 
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Arkison (In re Cascade Rds., Inc.), 34 F.3d 756, 767 (9th Cir. 1994); 
In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 620 (9th Cir. 1993) (corporation can seek damages under contempt theory); In re 
Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 186. But see In re Daniels, 206 B.R. 444, 446–47 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) 
(holding that it is improper for an individual to seek relief via a motion for contempt, and that sanctions should 
be pursued through § 362(k)). 
 227 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
 228 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 304, 98 Stat. 
333, 352. 
 229 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[2]. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a creditor would be held in 
contempt for willfully violating the Bankruptcy Rules if he knew that the debtor had filed for bankruptcy and 
still brought an action against the debtor without first securing the bankruptcy court’s permission. Fid. Mortg. 
Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc. (In re Fid. Mortg. Investors), 550 F.2d 47, 51–52 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 230 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[3]. 
 231 See 130 CONG. REC. 6,504 (1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (emphasis added). 
 232 See, e.g., Wagner v. Ivory (In re Wagner), 74 B.R. 898, 903 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Aponte v. Aungst 
(In re Aponte), 82 B.R. 738, 742 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Colon v. Hart (In re Colon), 114 B.R. 890, 898 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (“Congress intended, prior to the enactment of § 362(h), that enforcement of the 
automatic stay could be by civil contempt. The passage of section 362(h) was not intended to preclude the use 
of civil contempt.” (citation omitted)), appeal dismissed sub nom. Szostek v. Hart, 123 B.R. 719 (E.D. Pa. 
1991), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Colon v. Hart (In re Colon), 941 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
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Because § 105 does not offer any remedy that is not also available under 
§ 362(k),233 making § 362(k) available to all types of debtors (including those 
that are not individuals) would render § 105 superfluous.234 The Supreme 
Court has ruled, however, that statutes should be read so as to avoid 
superfluity.235 Thus, the only logical conclusion is that Congress intended for 
§ 105 to continue providing relief for those who cannot seek recourse under 
§ 362(k). 
While the standards and types of recovery are slightly different for § 362(k) 
and § 105,236 recovery under § 105 is sufficient for non-individuals.237 As a 
leading bankruptcy treatise concludes, “although the standards and procedures 
for contempt may be slightly more demanding, courts have had little difficulty 
dealing with and punishing stay violations even without the availability of 
section 362(k).”238 
Several courts have allowed trustees to recover under § 362(k) based on the 
availability of attorneys’ fees under this section.239 The trustee is obligated to 
recover property for the benefit of the estate and may incur large attorneys’ 
fees if litigation is required to address a stay violation that removed property 
from the estate.240 Courts have reasoned that, “[i]f the trustee incurs legal 
expenses in recovering such property and cannot recover his fees from the 
party that violated the stay, either the estate will be depleted by the amount of 
the trustee’s costs of recovery or the trustee will not be reimbursed for those 
costs.”241 
But a trustee does not have to proceed under § 362(k) to recover attorneys’ 
fees. Courts have consistently ruled that attorneys’ fees are recoverable as a 
 
 233 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) (offering compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and punitive 
damages), with id. § 105(a) (offering only compensatory damages and, in some cases, attorney’s fees).  
 234 Conversely, some courts have held that a finding of civil contempt is not a prerequisite to the 
imposition of sanctions under § 362(h). See Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 293 
(4th Cir. 1986). 
 235 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2474 (2010) (“[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation 
of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.” (quoting 
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 236 See supra text accompanying notes 85–94. 
 237 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 362.12[3] & n.39. 
 238 Id. ¶ 362.12. 
 239 Martino v. First Nat’l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, Inc.), 186 B.R. 414, 439 (N.D. 
Ill. 1995). 
 240 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006). 
 241 In re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, 186 B.R. at 439. 
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part of a contempt remedy under § 105.242 Because § 105 allows for the 
recovery of attorneys’ fees, the estate will not be depleted if the trustee must 
pursue a proceeding for a violation of the automatic stay to recover property of 
the estate.243 
B. Trustee’s Recovery of Punitive Damages Is Inappropriate 
Notwithstanding the differences between § 105 and § 362(k) discussed in 
the previous subpart, the main practical difference between the remedies under 
these two provisions is that punitive damages are available under § 362(k), 
whereas they are not available under § 105.244 Thus, imperative to any 
discussion on why a trustee should not be considered an individual under 
§ 362(k) is an analysis of why trustees should not recover punitive damages for 
a violation of the automatic stay. 
Because awarding punitive damages is controversial,245 courts should 
administer them thoughtfully, taking special care to examine the policy 
rationale for punitive damages and how the awarding of punitive damages for 
automatic stay violations would further these policies.246 
At least seven purposes for awarding punitive damages have been 
advanced, which include the following: “(1) punishing the defendant; (2) 
deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; (3) deterring others from 
committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private law 
enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; 
and (7) paying the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.”247 The Supreme Court, however, 
has recently stated that awarding punitive damages is “aimed . . . principally at 
 
 242 See Surette, supra note 40, § 6[a] (listing cases in which attorney’s fees have been awarded).  
 243 Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is clear that, even though a 
trustee does not qualify as an ‘individual’ for purposes of section 362(h), a trustee can recover damages in the 
form of costs and attorney’s fees under section 105(a) as a sanction for ordinary civil contempt.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 244 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1), with Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 245 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
869, 870 (1998); see Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court Needs a 
Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 781–93 (2010) (surveying modern Supreme Court 
case law to illustrate how punitive damages have evolved and been limited over the years). In fact, some 
scholars have gone so far as to argue that punitive damages have no deterrent or punitive effect. See generally 
W. Kip Viscusi, Why There is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381 (1998). 
 246 See generally Calandrillo, supra note 245. 
 247 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1982). 
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retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”248 Similarly, bankruptcy courts 
have repeatedly stated that the purposes of awarding punitive damages for a 
violation of an automatic stay are to deter future violations and to punish 
violators.249 
Although the goals of punitive damages are clear, the methods of assessing 
punitive damages to enforce these goals are notoriously inconsistent.250 
Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has espoused numerous tests and rules 
to solve the unpredictable and arbitrary nature of punitive judgments, yet the 
Court still employs a largely subjective approach that does not directly address 
the key question: what amount of damages is optimal to incentivize potential 
violators of the law (e.g., the automatic stay) to make socially optimal 
choices?251 
The law-and-economics theory of assessing and administering punitive 
damages may answer this question. This theory aims to determine 
systematically the appropriate levels of deterrence and punishment in society 
to maximize social welfare.252 A consistent approach is especially important to 
maintain a predictable and stable bankruptcy system that businesses, 
consumers, and attorneys can rely on when making financial decisions.253 
This Comment discusses the two main policy reasons for awarding punitive 
damages for automatic stay violations—deterrence and retribution—and uses a 
law-and-economics approach to argue that awarding punitive damages to 
trustees does not further these policies. Consequently, the remedies available 
under § 362(k) should be reserved solely for debtors who are natural persons. 
1. Administering Punitive Damages to Deter Future Violations 
Deterrence is one of the main purposes of awarding punitive damages in 
general254 and, in bankruptcy cases, for violations of the automatic stay.255 The 
 
 248 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008). 
 249 See, e.g., Frankel v. Strayer (In re Frankel), 391 B.R. 266, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re M & J 
Feed Mill, Inc., 112 B.R. 985, 990 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); Mercer v. D.E.F., Inc. (In re Mercer), 48 B.R. 
562, 565 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). The Supreme Court has also explained that punitive damages are for the 
purposes of deterrence and punishment. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 
(2001); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). 
 250 See Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 818–19. 
 251 See id. 
 252 Id. at 793. 
 253 Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 41, at 177–78. 
 254 See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. 
GOULD GALLEYS3 6/27/2013 2:17 PM 
2013] DON’T RELY ON PLAIN MEANING 501 
theory behind deterrence is that “a potential wrongdoer [will] refrain[] from 
engaging in prohibited conduct because he or she perceives and fears the threat 
of legal punishment.”256 
In theory, awarding punitive damages furthers both specific deterrence and 
general deterrence. In the context of automatic stay violations, specific 
deterrence refers to the deterrence of a specific creditor from violating the 
automatic stay in the future.257 General deterrence, on the other hand, refers to 
the deterrence of all creditors from violating the stay.258 
According to traditional justifications for imposing punitive damages, 
punitive damages are necessary for deterrence when compensatory damages 
alone are unlikely to have a sufficient deterrent effect either because (1) the 
wrongdoers are extremely likely to escape liability; or (2) compensatory 
damages are systematically too low.259 Trustees should not be able to recover 
punitive damages under the deterrence rationale because neither of these two 
circumstances applies to cases brought by trustees. Each of these two 
circumstances will be examined in turn below. 
a. High Likelihood of Escaping Liability 
According to economic theory, punitive damages intended to deter 
unwanted behavior should be awarded “if, and only if, an injurer has a 
significant chance of escaping liability for the harm he causes.”260 Conversely, 
 
 255 See Quiñones Lopez v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Quiñones Lopez), 319 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. 
D.P.R. 2004). 
 256 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for 
Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 111–12 (2002). The degree to which punitive damages actually deter 
undesirable behavior is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of psychological factors that may 
influence the deterrent effects of tort law, see generally Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in 
Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115 (1993). 
 257 Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008) (“An award of 
punitive damages [for violation of the automatic stay] is part a deterrent, i.e., to cause a change in the 
creditor’s behavior, and in this context the prospect of such change is relevant to the amount of punitive 
damages to be awarded.”); In re Pawlowicz, 337 B.R. 640, 648 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (explaining that “the 
primary purpose of an award of punitive damages becomes that which is sufficient to cause a change in the 
creditor’s behavior”). 
 258 See Frankel v. Strayer (In re Frankel), 391 B.R. 266, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (explaining that the 
purpose of the automatic stay is to deter the creditor and others like him from violating the automatic stay). 
 259 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 873–75. 
 260 Id. at 874 (emphasis removed). 
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punitive damages are inappropriate when the probability of detection is 
medium or high.261 
An injurer typically escapes liability for harms for which it should be liable 
in one of three circumstances: (1) the victim has difficulty determining that the 
harm was the result of another party’s unlawful conduct;262 (2) even if the 
victim knows that another wrongfully injured him, the victim has difficulty 
proving who specifically caused the harm;263 and (3) even if the victim knows 
that he was wrongfully injured and the party who injured him, the victim may 
decide to not sue the injurer.264 This third situation often arises when “the 
magnitude of the damage is small enough that it is not worth the victim’s time 
or expense to litigate.”265 
Punitive damages are inappropriate for trustees because violators of the 
automatic stay are less likely to escape liability for violating the stay when a 
trustee brings the suit on behalf of the estate than when a debtor brings the 
suit.266 The three circumstances in which an injurer often evades liability 
discussed above do not apply to cases brought by trustees for several reasons. 
First, a trustee would not have difficulty determining that a violation of the 
stay is an action that gives rise to a legal wrong.267 Because trustees are usually 
bankruptcy lawyers or accountants appointed by the U.S. trustee based on their 
knowledge of bankruptcy proceedings, they are likely to be very familiar with 
the kind of conduct that constitutes a violation of the stay.268 On the other 
hand, debtors generally have little or no experience with bankruptcy 
 
 261 See id. at 895–96. 
 262 Id. at 888; see also Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 800 (2010) (discussing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996), and concluding that punitive damages are appropriate because the company 
was unlikely to be sued by the victims who were unlikely to notice the wear and tear on their cars). 
 263 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 888.  
 264 Id.  
 265 Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 800; see Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676–77 
(7th Cir. 2003) (arguing that substantial punitive damages were necessary for adequate deterrence because the 
harmed individuals suffered only minor injuries and so would rationally choose not to sue and bear the costs of 
litigation). 
 266 See supra text accompanying note 179. 
 267 See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186 n.1 
(2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy 
Co.), 902 F.2d 1098, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 268 Cf. In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 150 B.R. 925, 928 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993). Congress may have 
viewed trustees and other entities, such as corporations, as “more likely to already know their rights under the 
bankruptcy law” because they are repeat players in the system. Id.; see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d 
at 186.  
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proceedings and may not realize that a creditor’s conduct constitutes a 
violation.269 While an individual debtor can hire a bankruptcy lawyer to guide 
him during the proceeding, he may not know that the violation is one that 
merits hiring an attorney in the first place.270 
Second, if there have been some violation of the stay and subsequent harm 
to the estate, the trustee would have no trouble determining which creditor is 
responsible because he has a professional responsibility to keep track of who 
the creditors are and what the respective debts owed to each of them are.271 
Third, a trustee is more likely to sue a violating creditor because the estate, 
rather than the trustee himself, is bearing the cost of litigation.272 Also, a 
trustee has the duty to administer and protect the property of the estate.273 
Debtors, however, are less likely to file a lawsuit and incur additional 
attorneys’ fees, which would deepen their existing debt. 
When the probability of detection is high, as it is in the case of a trustee 
representing the estate for a violation of an automatic stay, the damages 
awarded should equal the amount necessary to fully compensate for the harm 
caused.274 In other words, any award of damages should only be compensatory 
and should not include punitive damages.275 Awarding punitive damages in 
circumstances in which the probability of detection is high would result in 
“overdeterrence,” thus leading to “decreased productivity, increased cost, 
decreased consumption, and a decline in overall social welfare.”276 
If courts excessively apply punitive damages by awarding them to trustees 
in stay violation cases, then violating creditors would go to great lengths in the 
 
 269 See In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 150 B.R. at 928 (“Congress may have viewed natural persons as 
particularly vulnerable to violations of the automatic stay” and drafted § 362(k) to provide a “precise, easily 
applied, private cause of action to vindicate [their] rights, consistent with the consumer protection goals of the 
statute.”). 
 270 See id.; see also Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 800; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 888. 
 271 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(2) (2006) (detailing a trustee’s duties to maintain comprehensive records of the 
property of the estate); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2015. 
 272 See COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 323.03. Attorneys’ fees are not always awarded. See, e.g., Thornburg v. 
Lynch (In re Thornburg), 277 B.R. 719, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002); Chase Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Koch (In 
re Koch), 197 B.R. 654, 660 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996). 
 273 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a). 
 274 See Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 799; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 890. 
 275 “Specifically, punitive damages should equal the harm multiplied by . . . the ratio of the injurer’s 
chance of escaping liability to his chance of being found liable.” Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 890. 
 276 Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 799. 
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future to avoid paying those damages.277 For example, the creditor may choose 
to stop collecting debts that it is legally entitled to collect or to incur the 
expense of retaining lawyers to counsel it on collecting unpaid debts after a 
debtor has filed for bankruptcy. These actions would result in lost profits or 
increased costs for the creditor, which may cause the creditor to increase its 
interest rates on future loans. 
Alternatively, a deep-pocket creditor may hire judgment-proof independent 
contractors to engage in the behavior that violates the automatic stay to avoid 
the risk of punitive damages.278 These independent contractors are often 
undercapitalized and thus do not need to worry that their collection habits 
could expose them to liability.279 
b. Systematically Low Compensatory Damages 
Similar to the effect of having a high likelihood that a creditor will escape 
liability for a violation, if the damages awarded for certain automatic stay 
violations are systematically too low, such compensatory damages will not 
adequately deter creditors from violating the stay. In these cases, punitive 
damages are necessary to adequately deter unwanted behavior.280 
Compensatory damages are consistently too low when creditors seize a 
debtor’s personal property but the court does not award damages for emotional 
distress.281 Individual debtors, rather than trustees, usually bring cases in which 
the compensatory damages would be too low for adequate deterrence because 
trustees have little incentive to pursue recourse for violations of the stay that do 
not involve valuable property. The property at issue in these cases is often that 
which would not be valuable to the estate and thus to the trustee.282 
For example, in a case in which a creditor violated the automatic stay by 
taking possession of the debtor’s vehicle, the court held that there was 
insufficient evidence to award compensatory damages for vehicle expenses and 
 
 277 See id. at 802–03 (2010). 
 278 See id. at 803. 
 279 See id. 
 280 See Ellis Jr., supra note 247, at 26–31.  
 281 See, e.g., Bank of Bos. v. Baker (In re Baker), 140 B.R. 88, 89–90 (D. Vt. 1992). 
 282 6 COLLIER, supra note 3, ¶ 704.02[1]. 
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no basis for awarding damages for emotional distress.283 If the amount of 
damages were based solely on compensatory damages, the creditor would not 
have been required to pay anything for the violation. For this reason, the court 
awarded the debtor attorneys’ fees and $10,000 in punitive damages for the 
bank’s misconduct.284 
Furthermore, it is more important to deter violations of the stay that would 
result in a debtor taking action against the violating creditor, such as the 
wrongful repossession of exempted property, than violations that would result 
in the trustee taking action. The practice of awarding punitive damages for a 
violation of the automatic stay may deter would-be violators by encouraging 
these creditors to obtain relief from the stay or a determination that the stay 
does not preclude the creditors from exercising their interests in the debtor’s 
property.285 A creditor’s decision to seek such relief before repossessing the 
property is especially important when the property at stake is vital to the 
debtor’s livelihood or survival—such as the car the debtor uses to get to work 
or the bank account the debtor uses to buy daily groceries. The debtor is 
unlikely able to afford to lose such property for even a short amount of time. In 
contrast, the wrongful repossession of property belonging to the estate would 
not have the same negative effects, as a trustee is likely able to spend the time 
required to pursue the property without causing negative repercussions to the 
estate. 
2. Administering Punitive Damages to Punish Offenders 
Another purpose of punitive damages is to punish violators of the 
automatic stay.286 While awarding punitive damages for the purpose of 
deterrence is forward-looking and focuses on the consequences of the 
punishment, awarding punitive damages for retribution focuses on restoring 
the moral equilibrium after a wrongdoer has injured another party.287 Such 
 
 283 In re Baker, 140 B.R. at 89–90 (“Although the Bankruptcy Court indicated that other people may have 
been inconvenienced by debtor’s lack of an automobile, there was no evidence as to a rental car, or payment of 
expenses to people who transported debtor.”). 
 284 Id. 
 285 Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 902 F.2d 
1098, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 286 See, e.g., Frankel v. Strayer (In re Frankel), 391 B.R. 266, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re M & J 
Feed Mill, Inc., 112 B.R. 985, 990 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); Mercer v. D.E.F., Inc. (In re Mercer), 48 B.R. 
562, 565 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). 
 287 See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1393, 1432–33 (1993). 
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retributive punishment is a way to communicate to the offender that his 
behavior is prohibited.288 
According to legal scholar Jean Hampton’s theory of retributivism, when a 
wrongdoer harms another individual, it is the expression of a false view that 
such wrongdoer is of elevated value compared to the injured party.289 By 
committing the wrong, “the wrongdoer has implicitly asserted a kind of 
undeserved mastery and superiority over the victim.”290 Hampton’s theory 
provides that “[t]he purpose of punishment is to reassert the truth about the 
relative value of wrongdoer and victim by inflicting a publicly visible defeat 
on the wrongdoer.”291 Compensatory damages are sometimes insufficient to 
restore the disrupted moral equilibrium because they are based on the 
wrongdoer’s deserved loss, which is determined only by the injured party’s 
undeserved loss.292 
The bankruptcy system follows the same general rationale by using 
punitive damages to impose “appropriate sanctions on blameworthy parties.”293 
In this context, blameworthiness is equated with “the reprehensibility of a 
party’s conduct,” “[the conduct’s] maliciousness,” or “the extent to which [the 
conduct] reflects disregard for the well-being of others.”294 
Awarding punitive damages based on blameworthiness requires some 
analysis of the morality of the conduct, which is subjective and problematic 
when assessing the amount of damages to be awarded. In calculating punitive 
damages using a retribution rationale, however, courts have considered the 
following factors: 
whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the 
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of 
the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial 
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an 
 
 288 Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 239, 242 (2009). 
 289 Galanter & Luban, supra note 287, at 1432–34. 
 290 Id. at 1432. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. at 1433. 
 293 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 948. 
 294 Id. 
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isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, 
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.295 
Bankruptcy courts have similarly identified several factors to be considered 
when awarding punitive damages for a violation of the automatic stay, 
including “the nature of the creditor’s conduct, the nature and extent of harm to 
the debtor, . . . [and] the creditor’s motives.”296 
The most important factor courts must consider is the reprehensibility of 
the creditor’s conduct.297 In assessing the reprehensibility of the violator’s 
conduct, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between acts that inflict 
“purely economic” harm and instances that show a “reckless disregard for the 
health and safety of others,” implying that the latter should be subject to higher 
punitive damages.298 Similarly, one court explained that automobile 
repossessions, personal property, home foreclosures, and instances where 
bodily harm is threatened are the most serious violations.299 
Thus, a violation of an automatic stay is likely to be considered most 
reprehensible if it affects the individual debtor himself and not just the 
property belonging to the estate. The debtor, rather than the trustee, is usually 
the party to pursue a case involving physical harm to the debtor himself or a 
case involving the repossession of personal property because these items are 
most likely to be exempted from the estate.300 Trustees have a stake in 
pursuing a violation of a stay when the property involved is one of the key 
assets the trustee is trying to liquidate—that is, when the property is valuable 
and has not been exempted.301 When an individual debtor pursues an 
 
 295 See Markel, supra note 288, at 251 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 419 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 296 Galmore v. Dykstra (In re Galmore), 390 B.R. 901, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2008). Courts have also 
mentioned a creditor’s ability to pay damages, the level of a creditor’s sophistication, and any provocation by 
the debtor as factors to be considered. See, e.g., id. However, these factors are less relevant to assessing 
punitive damages for retributive reasons and will not be examined in this Comment. 
 297 Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (requiring a court to examine “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct” because it was “[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages 
award”). 
 298 Id. at 576. 
 299 Varela v. Ocasio (In re Ocasio), 272 B.R. 815, 826 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002); accord Progressive Motors, 
Inc. v. Frazier, 220 B.R. 476, 477–78 (D. Utah 1998) (repossession of a car); Bishop v. U.S. Bank/Firstar 
Bank, N.A. (In re Bishop), 296 B.R. 890, 898–99 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003) (repossession of a truck). 
 300 See, e.g., Frazier, 220 B.R. at 477 (repossession of a car); In re Bishop, 296 B.R. at 892–94 
(repossession of a truck).  
 301 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2006) (explaining that, in a chapter 7 case, the role of the trustee is to 
liquidate the debtor’s assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors in an expeditious manner).  
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adjudication of a stay violation, there are usually more than just financial 
interests at stake. Thus, a trustee does not have a compelling argument to assert 
a retributive rationale for punitive damages because the trustee does not have a 
personal stake in the matter. 
3. A Note on Awarding Punitive Damages to Serve a Compensatory 
Purpose 
Although some commentators have argued that punitive damages should 
not be awarded to correct for inadequate compensatory damages,302 punitive 
damages awarded in the circumstances described above are not to compensate 
the victim, but to either deter or punish the offender. Punitive damages, 
however, have a long history of being awarded to supplement compensatory 
damages for intangible wrongs.303 But, “as the scope of compensatory damages 
expanded to include intangible harms including hurt feelings and indignities in 
recent years, . . . the need to use punitive damages to compensate such harms 
may have diminished.”304 
Because punitive damages are awarded in reaction to a creditor’s conduct 
and not the plaintiff’s loss, it may seem irrelevant whether the plaintiff is a 
debtor or a trustee. The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that, while 
punitive damages are not compensatory, the plaintiff’s status is relevant to an 
assessment of punitive damages.305 “Moreover, notwithstanding the public 
nature of the retributive and deterrent functions the Court associates with extra-
compensatory damages, only a small number of states have adopted split 
recovery schemes through which the state shares in the pre-tax award of 
punitive damages.”306 “Consequently, in most states, if a court awards 
[punitive] damages, the plaintiff [(either the debtor or the debtor’s estate via 
the trustee)] will receive most, if not all, of [the award].”307 Thus, whether 
these damages are designed as compensatory, the fact that the plaintiff is the 
 
 302 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 245, at 942; see Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the 
Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 139–40 (1982). 
 303 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491–92 (2008); Calandrillo, supra note 245, at 781 
(listing “the essential functions of punitive damages: punishment, deterrence, and supplemental 
compensation”). 
 304 Markel, supra note 288, at 249. 
 305 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576–77 (1996) (listing the debtor’s financial vulnerability as a factor for 
determining the defendant’s degree of reprehensibility). 
 306 Markel, supra note 288, at 250. 
 307 Id. 
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party benefiting from the punitive damages suggests that there is, at least 
practically, a compensatory element to these damages that warrants further 
consideration. 
Requiring a creditor to pay punitive damages in a proceeding brought by an 
individual debtor makes intuitive sense. The debtor himself was wronged by 
the stay violation, and there is a sense that he deserves this extra compensation. 
But, requiring a creditor to pay punitive damages when the trustee asserts a 
stay violation produces a more absurd result. The punitive damages are 
awarded to the estate, which is then distributed to creditors. Thus, the creditors, 
including the one that violated the automatic stay resulting in the payment of 
punitive damages, reap the reward for the violation, albeit in an indirect way. 
This result is not likely what Congress intended when it enacted § 362(k). 
IV.  POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER BANKRUPTCY PLAYERS 
A determination of whether a trustee is considered an individual under 
§ 362(k) affects not only chapter 7 trustees, but also others who have standing 
to seek a remedy for a violation of the stay, including chapter 11 trustees, 
corporations, and other entities that are neither debtors nor pre-petition 
creditors.308 For this reason, should Congress choose to amend § 362(k) to 
specifically exclude trustees, it should be careful to construct a narrowly 
tailored provision that would not unintentionally exclude such parties. 
First, if a trustee is not considered an individual under § 362(k), a violating 
creditor can argue that a chapter 11 debtor in possession, like a trustee, is not 
an individual under § 362(k). Section 1107(a) states that “a debtor in 
possession shall have all the rights . . . and powers, and shall perform all the 
functions and duties, . . . of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.”309 
Furthermore, in § 1107(a)’s legislative history, Congress stated that § 1107(a) 
“places a debtor in possession in the shoes of a trustee in every way” and he is 
“subject to any limitations on a chapter 11 trustee.”310 Because a debtor in 
possession in chapter 11 has all the rights and is subject to all the limitations of 
an ordinary trustee, if a trustee is not considered an individual under § 362(k), 
then a violating creditor could argue that a chapter 11 debtor in possession may 
 
 308 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Alside Supply Ctr. of Knoxville (In re Clemmer), 178 B.R. 160, 162–63 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995); In re Prairie Trunk Ry., 112 B.R. 924, 929–31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). See 
generally Surette, supra note 40.  
 309 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006). 
 310 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 116 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5902.  
GOULD GALLEYS3 6/27/2013 2:17 PM 
510 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
not be considered an individual either. However, this argument is weak, as it 
would likely be considered to go against Congress’s intention. 
Second, courts have considered the issue of whether a corporation is an 
individual under § 362(k) as analogous to the issue of whether a trustee is an 
individual.311 If the plain meaning of “individual” in § 362(k) includes only 
natural persons, a corporation may not be considered an individual under the 
statute because a corporation also is not a natural person.312 Whether a 
corporation should be eligible to recover under § 362(k) is outside the scope of 
this Comment. However, in contrast to the case of trustees, it may be easier to 
argue that punitive damages are necessary to deter and punish stay violations 
against corporations.313 With respect to the issue of whether creditors’ 
violations would go undetected, corporations are more analogous to individual 
debtors than trustees. For instance, like individual debtors, corporations, 
especially closely held corporations, are often not as educated in bankruptcy as 
trustees are, and they have a more personal interest in the property than 
trustees do. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted § 362(k) to offer specific statutory protection for 
individual debtors victimized by a creditor’s violation of the automatic stay. It 
presumably recognized the importance of protecting vulnerable individual 
debtors unfamiliar with bankruptcy law314 and thus limited the recovery under 
§ 362(k) to “individuals injured” by an automatic stay violation.315 Trustees do 
not require a similar level of protection under the Code and do not need 
§ 362(k) to recover damages, specifically punitive damages. 
Since the enactment of § 362(k) in 1984, courts have repeatedly disagreed 
on whether the term “individual” encompasses only individual debtors or also 
 
 311 See, e.g., Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 184–
87 (2d Cir. 1990). See generally Swarthout, supra note 99.  
 312 In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 184–85. See generally Swarthout, supra note 99.  
 313 See Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 314 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97 (“The automatic 
stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a 
breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”). 
 315 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2006). 
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includes trustees.316 Although a circuit split on this issue has existed for the 
past decade and new case law is continually added to this split,317 there is still 
very little Supreme Court or congressional guidance on how to address this 
issue. 
Most courts have focused primarily on the plain meaning of the term 
“individual” to resolve this question.318 An analysis of the statute’s language in 
accordance with Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that the plain meaning 
of “individual” under § 362(k) only includes natural persons. Because trustees 
are representatives of a bankruptcy estate—an entity—they should not be 
considered natural persons for the purposes of § 362(k). Furthermore, trustees 
are not injured by the violation of the automatic stay, as the statute requires. 
Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to solely rely on plain meaning to resolve 
the question of whether a trustee is an individual under § 362(k). The rules for 
determining plain meaning espoused by the Supreme Court produce results 
that are unreliable, arbitrary, and in some cases, contradictory.319 And, the fact 
that courts have disagreed on the plain meaning of “individual” for the past 
thirty-five years suggests that the statute is ambiguous. 
The conclusion that the plain meaning of § 362(k) indicates that the term 
“individual” is meant to apply to only natural persons, and not to trustees, is 
consistent with the statute’s purpose to protect individual consumers. 
Furthermore, such a conclusion adheres to the goals behind the assessment of 
punitive damages—to deter violations of the stay and to punish violators. 
Appropriately, punitive damages are the only form of damages the trustee 
would not have access to if he were forced to rely on § 105 instead of § 362(k). 
 
 316 Compare Havelock v. Taxel (In re Pace), 67 F.3d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1995) (trustee is not an 
individual), In re Chateaugay Corp., 920 F.2d at 184–85 (corporate debtor is not an individual), and Sosne v. 
Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881, 884–85 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(corporate debtor is not an individual), with In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp., 901 F.2d at 329 (corporate debtor is 
an individual). 
 317 See, e.g., Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003); Barstow v. 
Ingaldson Maasen & Fitzgerald (In re Avery), Ch. 7 Case No. A06-00455-DMD, Adv. No. 85-1190, 2011 WL 
5330789, at *3 (Bankr. D. Alaska Nov. 4, 2011); In re Sayeh, 445 B.R. 19, 27 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); Gecker 
v. Gierczyk (In re Glenn), 379 B.R. 760, 762–63 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 318 See In re Pace, 67 F.3d at 193. 
 319 See, e.g., Bussel, supra note 150, at 897; Kelch, supra note 148, at 301–09; Klee & Merola, supra note 
148, at 1–2; Lawless, supra note 148, at 109–10; Markell, supra note 148, at 181–82; Tabb & Lawless, supra 
note 148, at 879–85; Tabb, supra note 148, at 570–75. 
GOULD GALLEYS3 6/27/2013 2:17 PM 
512 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
Several courts have reasoned that, plain meaning and congressional intent 
aside, an interpretation of § 362(k) that precludes trustees, and perhaps other 
major players in the bankruptcy system, from recovering under the statute 
would be contrary to the broad purpose of the automatic stay.320 According to 
the Supreme Court, however, “the sole function of the courts is to enforce [a 
statute] according to its terms,” not to attempt to improve enacted legislation as 
the courts see fit.321 As the Third Circuit stated in In re Chateaugay Corp., 
“even if we thought § 362(h) [(now § 362(k))] would better serve the code’s 
purposes by being applied to all debtors, we could do no more than invite 
Congress to change the result.”322 
Until Congress acts, the courts should enforce § 362(k) in a way that makes 
both interpretive and intuitive sense and preclude trustees from recovering 
punitive damages for a violation of the automatic stay. 
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